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RESTRAINTS ON TRADE AND THE ORDERLY
MARKETING OF GOODS*
Stanley D. Robinsont
One of the more intriguing aspects of the process by which goods
are marketed today is that businessmen have become increasingly re-
luctant to resort to contractual restrictions on competition which the
courts have sanctioned in the past. If a manufacturer is inclined to
grant a distributor an exclusive franchise in a particular area, it is not
unlikely that he will resist the temptation of entering into a written
covenant of exclusiveness.1 If the manufacturer wants to confine his
representative's sphere of operations to a specific territory, or to prevent
him from reselling to certain classes of customers, the chances are good
that these prohibitions will not be spelled out in the franchise agreement. 2
And if, perhaps in return for his own exclusive grant, the manufacturer
should desire undivided loyalty from his outlets, he is apt to be wary
of reducing any such requirement to writing.3 Discretion, in these cir-
cumstances, is frequently deemed the better part of valor. Presumably,
the feeling is that much the same objectives can be achieved through
noncontractual means which incur less antitrust risk.
Why this conservatism? Apart from the imposition of an exclusive
dealing obligation on the buyer, which is specifically governed by Section
3 of the Clayton Act,4 other facets of orderly marketing need only satis-
fy the less stringent command of the Sherman Law.5 Since we are not
in the realm of restraints which have been classified as illegal per se,6
* This article is based on a speech delivered by the author before the Section of Anti-
trust Law of the American Bar Association.
t See Contributors' Section, Masthead, p. 347, for biographical data.
1 See United States v. Sun Oil Co., 1959 Trade Cas. II 69,398, p. 75,507 (E.D. Pa. 1959)
("The giving of an 'exclusive franchise' is not expressed or implied in the written dealer
agreement forms, but is one of the understandings had with the dealer at the time he
enters into business relations with Sun"); Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car
Co., 243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 822 (1957); Schwing Motor Co.
v. Hudson Sales Corp., 138 F. Supp. 899 (D. Md.), aff'd per curiam, 239 F.2d 176
(4th Cir. 1956), cert denied, 355 U.S. 823 (1957).
2 Cf. Columbus Coated Fabrics Corp., FTC Dkt. 6677, Trade Reg. Rep. 9 27,906,
p. 36,963 (1959).
3 See, e.g., McElhenney Co. v. Western Auto Supply Co., 1959 Trade Cas. ff 69,416 (4th
Cir. 1959); Timken Roller Bearing Co., FTC Dkt. 6504, Trade Reg. Rep. f[ 27,244 (1958);
Leo J. Meyberg Co. v. Eureka Williams Corp., 215 F.2d 100 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 875 (1954); Hudson Sales Corp. v. Waldrip, 211 F.2d 268 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 821 (1954); Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911
(5th Cir. 1952), cert denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953); Carter Carburetor Corp. v. Federal
Trade Commission, 112 F.2d 722 (8th Cir. 1940), United States v. Sun Oil Co., 1959 Trade
Cas. 69,398 (E.D. Pa. 1959); United States v. J. I. Case Co., 101 F. Supp 856 (D. Minn.
1951).
4 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1958).
5 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2. (1958).
6 Of course, resale price maintenance, which is a method of orderly marketing, is per
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we must therefore consider the applicability of the rule of reason. Con-
ceding that trade is restrained by exclusive franchise agreements and ter-
ritorial and customer restrictions ancillary to a sale of goods-after all,
it is their very purpose to restrain-the question remains whether the
restraint is unreasonable and therefore unlawful.
I shall explore the status of these restraints at common law and under
our antitrust statutes, as well as their economic justification in a society
where competition is the order of the day.
REQUIRING THE SELLER TO DEAL EXCLUSIVELY WITH THE BUYER
Typically, the restraint of a seller at the buyer's behest takes the
form of an exclusive franchise or a full output contract. In both in-
stances, the seller disables himself by agreeing not to compete, directly
or indirectly, with his customer. Covenants of this type may be denom-
inated exclusive selling arrangements, as distinguished from exclusive
dealing agreements which restrain the buyer. The legality of the seller's
promise is measured by the general prohibitions of the Sherman Act,7
and those prohibitions derive their content from the antecedent common
law.
The rules governing covenants not to compete were developed initially
in cases involving agreements incident to an employment contract or
the sale of a business. The principal concerns were with idleness, losing
the productive efforts of a useful member of society, and the possibility
that the covenantor would become a public charge.' Given this origin
for the restraint of trade concept, some courts at first were unable to
perceive any "restraint" in full output contracts, since the manufacturer
was not prevented from carrying on his trade, but, if anything, had
an incentive to produce as much as possible.' As one judge said: "No
restriction is put upon the defendant; he may manufacture as largely
as he will.""' The courts were quicker to see a restraint where the
buyer did not obligate himself to take the seller's entire production,
but nevertheless bound the seller not to compete with him or deal with
se unlawful unless immunized by fair trade legislation. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert
Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951). The subject of fair trade, however, opens up so
many vistas that it is not feasible to discuss it within the confines of this paper.
7 Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which prohibits "unfair methods of
competition," can also be invoked (see Hershey Chocolate Corp. v. Federal Trade Com-
mission, 121 F.2d 968 (3d Cir. 1941)), but virtually all of the federal cases involving
exclusive selling agreements have been brought under the Sherman Act.
8 See Mitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P. WVms. 181, 190, 24 Eng. Rep. 347, 350 (1711); Darcy v.
Allen, 11 Coke 84, 86, 77 Eng. Rep. 1260, 1262 (1602).
0 Long v. Towl, 42 Mo. 545 (1868); Hadden v. Dimick, 31 How. Prac. 196 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1866); Van Marter v. Babcock, 23 Barb. 633, 636 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County
1857) ; see also Arnot v. Pittston & Elmira Coal Co., 68 N.Y. 558, 566-67 (1877).
10 Hadden v. Dimick, 31 How. Prac. 196, 226 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1866).
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his competitors." Eventually, judges also came to realize that a full
output contract might restrain the trade of other buyers who had to go
elsewhere for supplies.'2 But whatever form exclusive selling took, once
a restraint was acknowledged, its validity was generally tested in terms
of the rules governing covenants ancillary to the sale of a business.13
In his classic synthesis of the pre-Sherman Act authorities in Addys-
ton Pipe,'4 Chief Justice Taft, then a Circuit Judge, stated that the com-
mon law sustained an agreement ". . . by the seller of property or busi-
ness not to compete with the buyer in such a way as to derogate from
the value of the property or business sold." 5 The only qualification
was that the restriction be "... . such only as to afford a fair protection
to the interests of the party in favor of whom it ... [was] given, and
not so large as to interfere with the interests of the public."' In apply-
11 See, e.g., Pacific Factor Co. v. Adler, 90 Cal. 110, 27 Pac. 36 (1891) (option contract) ;
Santa Clara Valley Mill & Lumber Co. v. Hayes, 76 Cal. 387, 18 Pac. 391 (1888) (fixed
quantity contract); W. W. Roller & Co. v. Ott, 14 Kan. 609 (1875) (exclusive franchise);
Arnot v. Pittston & Elmira Coal Co., 68 N.Y. 558 (1877) (exclusive franchise); Excelsior
Quilting Co. v. Creter, 36 Misc. 698, 74 N.Y. Supp. 361 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1902)
(fixed quantity contract).
12 See Fargo Glass & Paint Co. v. Globe American Corp., 201 F.2d 534 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 345 U.S. 942 (1953); Carter-Crume Co. v. Peurrung, 86 Fed. 439 (6th Cir.
1898); Over v. Byram Foundry Co., 37 Ind. App. 452, 77 N.E. 302 (1906).
'3 See, e.g., Keith v. Hirschberg Optical Co., 48 Ark. 138, 2 S.W. 777 (1887); Newell
v. Meyendorff, 9 Mont. 254, 23 Pac. 333 (1890); Blauner v. Williams Co., 36 Misc. 173,
73 N.Y. Supp. 165 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1901); Van Marter v. Babcock, 23 Barb. 633
(Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1857); Live Stock Ass'n v. Levy, 54 N.Y. Super Ct. 32 (1886);
Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass'n v. Houck, 27 S.W. 692 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894); Clark v.
Crosby, 37 Vt. 188 (1864). The validity of the contract was sustained in each of these
cases on the ground that the restriction was "partial" or "limited" and not "total" or
"general," without any inquiry concerning the effect of the restraint on competition.
There have been many suits to enforce contracts containing exclusive selling clauses
where the issue of illegality was neither interposed as a defense nor raised by the court
sua sponte. E.g., Rudolph v. Laser, 156 Ark. 5, 245 S.W. 302 (1922); Bride v. Rifle, 93
Neb. 355, 140 N.W. 639 (1913); Meade v. Poppenberg, 167 App. Div. 411, 153 N.Y. Supp.
182 (4th Dep't 1915); Koener v. Henn, 8 App. Div. 602, 40 N.Y. Supp. 1021 (4th Dep't
1896); Kessler v. A. W. Haile Motor Co., 127 Misc. 413, 217 N.Y. Supp. 182 (Sup. Ct. Erie
County 1926); Fine v. H. & H. Pioneer Savings Stamp Co., 191 Okla. 685, 132 P.2d 935
(1942); Leisy Brewing Co. v. Schafer, 91 Okla. 105, 216 Pac. 109 (1923); Western
Macaroni Mfg. Co. v. Fiore, 47 Utah 108, 151 Pac. 984 (1915) ; Elk Refining Co. v. Falling
Rock Cannel Coal Co., 92 W. Va. 479, 115 S.E. 431 (1922); Thurmond v. Paragon
Colliery Co., 82 W. Va. 49, 95 S.E. 816 (1918).
14 United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S.
211 (1899).
1' 85 Fed. at 281. Accord, Restatement, Contracts § 516(a) (1932).
16 85 Fed. at 282. Not only was this formulation of the rule applied to sales of chattels
[United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 45 F. Supp. 387, 398 (S.D.N.Y. 1942), aff'd
by an equally divided Court, 321 U.S. 707 (1944); Bascom Launder Corp. v. Telecoin
Corp., 204 F.2d 331, 335 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 994 (1953); Excelsior
Quilting Co. v. Creter, 36 Misc. 698, 701, 74 N.Y. Supp. 361, 363 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1902)], but it was extended to the licensing of motion pictures in United States v. Para-
mount Pictures, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 323, 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1946), aff'd in pertinent part, 334 U.S.
131 (1948). Motion pictures have traditionally been distributed on an exclusive basis ac-
cording to a system of staggered runs and clearance. The distributor grants the exhibitor
an exclusive license to display the film within his competitive area and covenants not to
permit competing exhibitors to show the same picture until a period of time has elapsed
following the prior run. In upholding reasonable clearance under the Sherman Act, judge
Augustus Hand held that:
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ing this test to exclusive selling agreements, the public interest criterion
has become synonymous with absence of monopoly.17 If the seller
monopolizes the product, or if the buyer is endeavoring to corner the
market, the restriction is not countenanced. 8 But where there are other
suppliers to whom competing buyers can turn, the rule is ... virtually
one of per se legality."' 9
. . . a grant of a clearance, when not accompanied by a fixing of minimum prices
or not unduly extended as to area or duration, affords a fair protection to the interests
of the licensee without unreasonably interfering with the interests of the public. At
common law a vendor of income-producing property may validly covenant with his
purchaser not to compete for a given time or within a given area so long as the
restrictions are reasonably necessary to protect the value of the property purchased....
It is true that licenses of property rather than sales are here concerned and that the
distributors covenant not only not to exhibit the films themselves, but also not to li-
cense them to others. Nevertheless, we believe these are not differences which affect the
applicability of the common-law rule ...
66 F. Supp. at 341.
17 [T]he Sherman Act was not violated, because the manufacturer had no monopoly
of the product, and the "restraint of trade" was (a) ancillary to a reasonable main
purpose-a source of supply to the distributor-and (b) fairly protective of that
distributor's interests but not so large as to interfere with the interests of the public.
Bascom Launder Corp. v. Telecoin Corp., 204 F.2d 331, 335 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
345 U.S. 994 (1953). It was generally assumed at common law that where no monopoly
or attempt to corner the market was involved, the public had no interest in an exclusive
selling contract. See, e.g., Excelsior Quilting Co. v. Creter, 36 Misc. 698, 700, 74 N.Y. Supp.
361, 362 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1902) (purchase of fixed quantity with covenant by
vendor not to sell to others; "it is really one of individual right, with which the question
of public policy has little, if anything, to do."); Newell v. Meyendorff, 9 Mont. 254, 23
Pac. 333 (1890) (exclusive franchise; "the public is not deprived of the alleged restricted
party's industry. On the contrary, the contract provides for the placing upon the Montana
market the product of the plaintiffs' industry, by the selection and service of a local
Montana agent, interested in the success of sales, and to be rewarded by such success").
Cf. Attorney General of Commonwealth of Australia v. Adelaide Steamship Co., [1913]
A.C. (P.C.) 781, 796 ("Their Lordships are not aware of any case in which a restraint,
though reasonable in the interests of the parties, has been held unenforceable because it
involved some injury to the public").
18 Hershey Chocolate Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission, 121 F.2d 968 (3d Cir. 1941);
American & British Mfg. Corp. v. New Idria Quicksilver Mining Co., 293 Fed. 509 (1st Cir.
1923); Morey v. Paladini, 187 Cal. 727, 203 Pac. 760 (1922); Santa Clara Valley Mill &
Lumber Co. v. Hayes, 76 Cal. 387, 18 Pac. 391 (1888).
19 Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418, 420 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 822 (1957). Exclusive selling arrangements were sustained
under the Sherman Act in Lawlor v. National Screen Service Corp., 1959 Trade Cas.
fJ 69,446 p. 75,678 (3d Cir. 1959); Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co.,
243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 822 (1957); Schwing Motor Co. v
Hudson Sales Corp., 138 F. Supp. 899 (D. Md.), aff'd per curiam, 239 F.2d 176 (4th Cir.
1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 823 (1957) ; Bascom Launder Corp. v. Telecoin Corp., 204 F.2d
331 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 345 U.S. 994 (1953); Fargo Glass & Paint Co. v. Globe American
Corp., 201 F.2d 534 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 942 (1953) ; United States v. Bausch &
Lomb Optical Co., 45 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1942), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 321
U.S. 707 (1944); Carter-Crume Co. v. Peurrung, 86 Fed 439 (6th Cir. 1898); cf. Poller v.
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 1959 Trade Cas. f[ 69,391, p. 75,477 (D.D.C. 1959).
Cases upholding similar agreements under analogous state antitrust statutes or common law
principles include Milton v. Hudson Sales Corp., 152 Cal. App. 2d 418, 313 P.2d 936 (1957) ;
Rolley, Inc. v. Merle Norman Cosmetics, Inc., 129 Cal. App. 2d 844, 278 P.2d 63 (1954);
Superior Coal Co. v. Darlington Lumber Co., 236 Ill. 83, 86 N.E. 180 (1908); Lanyon v.
Garden City Sand Co., 223 Ill. 616, 79 N.E. 313 (1906); Match Co. of America v. Acme
Match Corp., 285 Ill. App. 197, 1 N.E.2d 867 (1936); American Sand & Gravel Co. v. Chi-
cago Gravel Co., 184 Ill. App. 509 (1914); Heinbuecher v. Goff, Horner & Co., 119 Ill. App.
373 (1905) ; Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. Paine & Nixon Co., 182 Minn. 159, 234 N.W. 453
1960]
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This principle was applied a few years ago by two federal Courts of
Appeals in the Schwing2° and Packard"' cases, where exclusive automo-
bile dealerships survived attack under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act. Both courts rejected the notion that the vertical agreement between
a single manufacturer and dealer constituted an illicit conspiracy or
attempt to monopolize. Of particular interest were the efforts of the
plaintiffs, who had been disfranchised as a result of the "exclusive," to
bring their grievances within the monopoly exception to the general rule.
They urged that the relevant market consisted of Hudson and Packard
cars, respectively, rather than all automobiles; hence, they argued, a
local monopoly had been conferred on the exclusive dealer. If this
reasoning had been accepted, every exclusive franchise involving a trade-
marked article would be illegal regardless of the vigor of inter-brand
competition.22 But, as Mr. Justice Reed pointed out in the Cellophane
case, the power that a manufacturer has over the price and production
of his branded product does not make an unlawful monopoly. "Illegal
power must be appraised in terms of the competitive market for the
product."2 3 Under this test, far from there being any monopoly, both
Hudson and Packard encountered the stiffest competition from the other
automobile manufacturers.
(1930); Mar-Hof Co. v. Rosenbacher, 176 N.C. 330, 97 S.E. 169 (1918); Kansas City
Pants & Skirt Co. v. Cohlmia, 138 Okla. 151, 280 Pac. 611 (1929); Rice v. State, 108
Okla. 4, 232 Pac. 807 (1924); Walter A. Wood Mowing & Reaping Co. v. Greenwood
Hardware Co., 75 S.C. 378, 55 S.E. 973 (1906); Lien v. Northwestern Engineering Co.,
73 S.D. 84, 39 N.W.2d 483 (1949); Sunset Oil Co. v. Vertner, 34 Wash. 2d 268, 208 P.2d
906 (1949). See Restatement, Contracts § 516(a), (e), Illustration 7 (1932). But cf.
Alexander's Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Ohrbach's, Inc., 266 App. Div. 535, 42 N.Y.S.2d 703 (1st
Dep't), appeal dismissed, 291 N.Y. 707, 52 N.E.2d 595 (1943).
Even where alternative sources of supply may have been available, covenants binding the
seller not to sell to anyone but the covenantee for an indefinite period, or for a number
of years, have been held unenforceable where there was no concomitant obligation on the
part of the covenantee to purchase during that period. Larido Corp. v. Crusader Mfg. Co.,
4 Misc. 2d 231, 155 N.Y.S.2d 715 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1956); Cole Steel Equipment Co.
v. Art-Lloyd Metal Products Corp., 144 N.Y.S.2d 364 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1955) rev'd, 1,
App. Div. 2d 148, 148 N.Y.S.2d 440 (1st Dep't 1956); see also Scapa Dryers, Inc. v. Abney
Mills, 1959 Trade Cas. ff 69,392 (5th Cir. 1959).
Exclusive selling agreements have also been invalidated where they were part and parcel
of a price-fixing scheme. E.g., Barataria Canning Co. v. Joulian, 80 Miss. 555, 31 So. 961
(1902; Stewart v. W. T. Rawleigh Medical Co., 58 Okla. 344, 159 Pac. 1187 (1916).
20 Schwing Motor Co. v. Hudson Sales Corp., 138 F. Supp. 899 (D. Md.), aff'd per
curiam, 239 F.2d 176 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 823 (1957).
21 Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 822 (1957).
22 See Schwing Motor Co. v. Hudson Sales Corp., 138 F. Supp. at 903. But cf. United
States v. Guerlain, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), judgment vacated on motion
of the United States, 358 U.S. 915 (1958), dismissed on motion of the United States, 1959
Trade Cas. ff 69, 352 p. 75,298 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), criticized in Handier, "Trademarks-Assets
or Liabilities?," 48 Trademark Rep. 661 (1958).
23 United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 393 (1956).
24 Cf. Paramount Film Distributing Corp. v. Village Theatre, Inc., 228 F.2d 721 (10th
Cir. 1955), where a theatre operator claimed that he had been deprived of first-run
Paramount pictures as a result of a vertical agreement between Paramount and a former
affiliated exhibitor to favor the latter. The trial judge instructed the jury that such an
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As a matter of antitrust policy, there are sound reasons for permitting
exclusive selling so long as there is effective competition in the relevant
market. A manufacturer may find it necessary to offer a measure of
security to his dealers in order to build a strong distributing organi-
zation. A dealer understandably may be reluctant to invest capital and
devote his energies to developing a good will that may be jeopardized
if his supplier is free to vie with him either directly or by establishing
another outlet in the same area.25 The less powerful the manufacturer,
the more apt the dealer will be to get concrete assurance that this will
not occur. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia saw this
very clearly in the Packard case, when it said:
The short of it is that a relatively small manufacturer, competing with
large manufacturers, thought it advantageous to retain its largest dealer in
Baltimore, and could not do so without agreeing to drop its other Balti-
more dealers. To penalize the small manufacturer for competing in this
way not only fails to promote the policy of the antitrust laws but defeats
it.26
agreement, if proved, was unlawful per se. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that
the legality of the claimed agreement should have been submitted to the jury as an issue of
fact under the rule of reason. But it refused to go so far as to hold that an exclusive
dealing arrangement between a single distributor and an exhibitor was necessarily lawful.
Since Paramount obviously did not enjoy a monopoly position in the distribution of
motion pictures, the refusal of the Tenth Circuit to dismiss the complaint is inconsistent
with the rationale of Schwing and Packard.
Since the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Packard and Schwing, we do not have a
final exposition of the law on exclusive selling. Nevertheless, it is hard to believe that the
Court would have declined to review these decisions if it had disagreed with their result.
In Packard, the plaintiff had obtained a jury verdict, only to have the judgment overturned
as a matter of law by a divided Court of Appeals. In Schwing, the plaintiff never got to
trial at all; the District judge dismissed the complaint and was affirmed on appeal.
Bearing in mind that the Supreme Court is a zealous guardian of the right to a jury trial
(Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959)), it is a reasonably safe inference that
the highest tribunal agrees that exclusive selling arrangements are lawful where there is
effective outside competition. Indeed, even so staunch a supporter of strict antitrust
enforcement as Mr. justice Douglas recently intimated that he did not look with jaundiced
eye on the "institution of the exclusive agency," which, he remarked, "is, of course, well
known in the law." Denver Union Stock Yard Co. v. Producers Livestock Marketing
Assn., 356 U.S. 282, 288 (1958). See also Mr. justice Black in Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-
Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959). It is interesting to note, moreover, that in Black &
White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown and Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518
(1928), the Court applied the general rule at common law in enforcing a contract under
which a railroad granted a taxi company the exclusive privilege of soliciting fares at the
railroad's depot. The Court felt that public policy required the utmost liberty of con-
tracting, and that the exclusive arrangement was reasonable because it ". . . makes for good
order at railway stations, prevents annoyance, serves convenience and promotes safety of
passengers" (Id. at 528-29). See also Delaware, Lackawanna & Western RR. v. Town of
Morristown, 276 U.S. 182 (1928); Donovan v. Pennsylvania Co., 199 U.S. 279 (1905).
25 In United States v. Sun Oil Co., 1959 Trade Cas. f[ 69,398, p. 75,507 (ED. Pa. 1959),
the court found that the defendant "operates under the 'franchise' plan of distribution
whereby it does business with a dealer only if the station will not compete to an appre-
ciable degree with another Sun dealer in the immediate adjoining area." The reasoning
underlying this policy was explained by Sun as follows: "We believe that in offering to
a dealer a franchise to be the sole marketer of our products in a limited market area gives
him the opportunity to wholeheartediy develop business for our products, without the
fear that he is building up patronage for Sunoco products that may drift to another
Sunoco dealer across the street." p. 75,507 n.8.
26 243 F.2d at 421.
1960]
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In other words, if there is to be vigorous competition between sellers
of different brands, it may be necessary to forego a certain degree of
intra-brand rivalry. This seems a small price to pay for a concomitant
enhancement of competition in the market as a whole. To be sure, the
courts do not insist on an affirmative showing that competition will be
strengthened by the arrangement. It suffices that no significant deteri-
oration of competitive forces is likely. Thus, where a full output con-
tract is obtained from a non-monopolist, the supplier, of necessity, is
unable to satisfy the demand of other potential customers. Yet if there
is ample access to the product elsewhere, why should the buyer be
precluded from securing an assured source of supply? As a matter of
fact, here again competition may be benefited in the long run. In the
Bausch & Lomb case,17 although the court condemned an elaborate
distribution system designed to fix resale prices, it did not disturb a
separate arrangement whereby Bausch & Lomb agreed to manufacture
pink-tinted glass only for Soft-Lite and not to compete with it in the
sale of lenses made from such glass. The restraining covenant, it stated,
was "... for the protection of the purchaser who is spending large sums
to develop his good will and enlarge the public patronage of a relatively
new article of commerce.1128 Furthermore, the court noted, not only did
competing lens manufacturers have adequate supplies of pink glass
from other sources, but the success of Soft-Lite had actually "stimulated
emulation and competition.;
29
Since Bausch & Lomb, exclusive selling has rarely come under gov-
ernmental fire. In a later case, which involved an international cartel,
the Department of Justice was unsuccessful in its attempt to enjoin
one of the defendants from continuing exclusive distributing arrange-
ments which had not been employed in furtherance of the conspiracy. 0
But by and large the attacks have come from private parties seeking
treble damages. 1 And, as we have seen, their efforts to induce the courts
27 United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 45 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1942), aff'd
by an equally divided Court, 321 U.S. 707 (1944).
28 45 F. Supp. at 398.
29 Id. at 399.
30 Terming this an "ordinary" commercial practice, the court considered it entirely
lawful "absent proof that the designation of an exclusive distributor was made to achieve
an illegal end." United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., 105 F. Supp. 215, 244-
45 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). Cf. United States v. American Type Founders Co., 1958 Trade Cas.
f 69,065, p. 74,206 (D.NJ. 1958), a consent decree enjoining defendant from entering into
an agreement with any manufacturer "restricting or preventing any foreign manufacturer
from exporting to and selling products in the United States to ultimate consumers, except
where defendant has an exclusive distributorship for said products in the United States
from such foreign manufacturer." See also United States v. Pitney-Bowes, Inc., 1959 Trade
Cas. ff 69,235, p. 74,856 (D. Conn. 1959), a consent decree in which defendant was expressly
not prohibited "from entering into bona fide exclusive distributorship arrangements for
designated territories" with persons not in a particular class.
81 E.g., Lawlor v. National Screen Service Corp., 1959 Trade Cas. II 69, 446, p. 74,678 (3rd
[Vol. 45
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to depart from traditional doctrine have met with signal failure. This
is an area, then, where it can be said with some certainty that the anti-
trust laws do not stand in the way of a normal and reasonable restriction
on competition. The rule of reason operates here in full sway.
CONFINING THE BUYER TO A SPECIFIC TERRITORY
Orderly marketing, of course, is not a one way street. It may not be
enough for a manufacturer to give his dealers exclusive franchises in
particular territories. To have an efficient system of distribution, it may
be necessary for him to place certain checks on the areas in which his
goods are resold. Thus, if a dealer is assured that his supplier will not
compete with him in his assigned area, the supplier is apt to want assur-
ance that his only link to the public in that locale will fully exploit its
market potential. This objective may be thwarted if his dealers cross
over into each other's domain and thereby spread themselves too thin.
Suppliers attempted to cope with this problem at an early date by
requiring dealers to confine their operations to designated geographical
limits. While there is a respectable body of authority, both state32 and
federal,3 3 upholding ancillary territorial restrictions as reasonable re-
Cir. 1959); Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 822 (1957); Schwing Motor Co. v. Hudson Sales Corp., 138 F. Supp.
899 (D. Md.), aff'd per curiam, 239 F.2d 176 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 823
(1957); Paramount Film Distributing Corp. v. Village Theatre, Inc., 228 F.2d 721 (10th
Cir. 1955); Bascom Launder Corp. v. Telecoin Corp., 204 F.2d 331 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 345 U.S. 994 (1953); Fargo Glass & Paint Co. v. Globe American Corp., 201 F.2d
534 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 942 (1953).
32 E.g., Johnston v. Franklin Kirk Co., 83 Ind. App. 519, 148 N.E. 177 (1925); Revlon
Products Corp. v. Bernstein, 204 Misc. 80, 119 N.Y.S.2d 60 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1953),
aff'd, 285 App. Div. 1139, 142 N.Y.S.2d 364 (1st Dep't 1955); Stemmerman v. Kelly, 150
App. Div. 735, 135 N.Y. Supp. 827 (1st Dep't 1912), aff'd, 220 N.Y. 756, 116 N.E. 1077
(1917); Thomas v. Belcher, 184 Okla. 410, 87 P.2d 1084 (1939); Delk v. City Nat'l Bank
of Duncan, 85 Okla. 238, 205 Pac. 753 (1922); Walter A. Wood Mowing & Reaping Co. v.
Greenwood Hardware Co., 75 S.C. 378, 55 S.E. 973 (1906); cf. McConkey v. Smith, 112
Kan. 560, 211 Pac. 631 (1923) (relationship between manufacturer and dealer held to be
one of agency).
In McConkey v. Smith, supra, where the franchise recited that "... this paragraph shall
be construed as an agreement between dealer and all other Studebaker dealers who have
signed a similar agreement . . ." (id. at 561), the territorial restriction was upheld at the
suit of an injured dealer. And Johnston v. Franklin Kirk Co., supra, enforced a provision
in a franchise agreement which required a dealer invading the territory of another to
pay the latter 10% of the list price of the automobile. In all probability, the federal courts
would view these recitals as evidence of an unlawful horizontal agreement between dealers
to allocate markets. To sustain a territorial restriction on a buyer, it must appear that
the restraint is designed to protect the business of the seller. If it can be shown that this
is not the primary objective but rather that the purpose is to spare buyers from competi-
tion with one another, the traditional justification for the restraint disappears. Cf. United
States v. American Linen Supply Company, 141 F. Supp. 105, 114-15 (N.D. Ill. 1956).
33 Boro Hall Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 124 F.2d 822 (2d Cir.), rehearing denied,
130 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 695 (1943); Phillips v. Iola Portland
Cement Co., 125 Fed. 593 (8th Cir. 1903), cert. denied, 192 U.S. 606 (1903); Cole Motor
Car Co. v. Hurst, 228 Fed. 280 (5th Cir. 1915), writ of error denied sub nom. Tillar v.
Cole Motor Car Co, 246 Fed. 831 (5th Cir. 1917), cert. denied, 247 U.S. 511 (1918); cf.
Sinclair Refining Co. v. Wilson Gas & Oil Co., 52 F.2d 974 (W.D.S.C. 1931).
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 45
straints of trade, very little case law on this subject has been forth-
coming in recent years. Manufacturers resorting to this practice have,
without a court test, been succumbing to Sherman Act assaults by the
Department of Justice.4 It is appropriate, therefore, to take a fresh
look at the pertinent decisions, their underlying support in the common
law, and the basis, if any, for questioning their vitality.
Just as the common law authorized a seller to agree, ancillary to a
sale of property, not to compete with the purchaser, so too it permitted
an agreement ". . . by the buyer of property not to use the same in
competition with the business retained by the seller." 35 In 1874 the
Supreme Court applied this principle in enforcing a ten-year covenant
by the purchaser of a steamer not to run it in California waters, where
it would compete with the seller's steamship business." The theory of
the ruling was that the restraint was only as broad and long as was
reasonably necessary to avoid interference with the trade retained by
the seller, and that "it promoted the general interests of commerce on
the Pacific coast."3 7 The continued precedential force of this decision
34 United States v. Bostitch, Inc., 1958 Trade Cas. f1 69,207, p. 74,741 (D.R.I. 1958);
United States v. American Type Founders Co., 1958 Trade Cas. 1U 69,065, p. 74,205 (D.N.J.
1958); United States v. American Body and Trailer, Inc., 1958 Trade Cas. f[ 69,063,
p. 74,200 (W.D. Okla. 1958); United States v. Rudolph Wurlitzer Co., 1958 Trade Cas.
Uf 69,011, p. 74,007 (W.D.N.Y. 1958); United States v. Necchi Sewing Machine Sales Corp.,
1958 Trade Cas. ff 68,957, p. 73,841 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); United States v. AMI Inc., 1957
Trade Cas. ff 68,758, p. 73,099 (W.D. Mich. 1957); United States v. J. P. Seeburg Corp.,
1957 Trade Cas. Uf 68,613, p. 72,479 (N.D. Ill. 1957); United States v. American Linen
Supply Co., 1956 Trade Cas. ff 68,542, p. 72,201 (N.D. Ill. 1956); United States v. Philco
Corp., 1956 Trade Cas. Uf 68,409, p. 71,753 (E.D. Pa. 1956); United States v. Reddi-Whip,
Inc., 1955 Trade Cas. Uf 68,187, p. 70,877 (S.D. Cal. 1955); United States v. Liberty Na-
tional Life Ins. Co., 1954 Trade Cas. Uf 67,801, p. 69,582 (NJ). Ala. 1954); United States v.
Austenal Laboratories, Inc., 1951 Trade Cas. Uf 62,880, p. 64,616 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); United
States v. Bendix Home Appliances, Inc., 1948-49 Trade Cas. Uf 62,346, pp. 62,899-900
(S.D.N.Y. 1948); United States v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 1948-49 Trade Cas.
Uf 62,323, p. 62,811 (N.D. Ohio 1948); United States v. A. B. Dick Co., 1948-49 Trade Cas.
Uf 62,233, p. 62,358 (N.D. Ohio 1948). But cf. United States v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal.,
1959 Trade Cas. Uf 69,399, p. 75,533 (S.D. Cal. 1959).
35 United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271, 281 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd,
175 U.S. 211 (1899). Accord, Restatement, Contracts § 516(b) (1932).
36 Oregon Steam Navigation Co. v. Winsor, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 64 (1874). Accord,
Hill v. Staples, 85 Ga. 863, 11 S.E. 967 (1890); Dunlop v. Gregory, 10 N.Y. 241 (1851).
37 Oregon Steam Navigation Co. v. Winsor, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 64, 69 (1874). In
Fowle v. Park, 131 U.S. 88 (1889), the Court enforced a contract restricting the territorial
limits within which the purchaser of a patent medicine formula could manufacture and
sell the product. The restraint was unlimited as to time and the Court's decision was
rendered more than forty years after the original contract was entered into between the
buyer and the seller. The Court reasoned:
Relating as these contracts did to a compound involving a secret in its preparation;
based as they were upon a valuable consideration, and limited as to the space within
which, though unlimited as to the time for which, the restraint was to operate, we
are unable to perceive how they could be regarded as so unreasonable as to justify the
court in declining to enforce them.
The vendors were entitled to sell to the best advantage, and in so doing to exercise
the right to preclude themselves from entering into competition with those who pur-
chased, and to prevent competition between purchasers; and the purchasers were
entitled to such protection as was reasonably necessary for their benefit. . . . If the
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under the Sherman Act is demonstrated by the fact that only a few
months ago the Fifth Circuit relied on it in sanctioning a similar geo-
graphical limitation incident to the sale of a vessel. 8 To Chief Judge
Hutcheson, the legality of the covenant was open and shut once he was
satisfied that it was reasonable in spatial and temporal coverage: "An-
cillary restrictions of this kind," he wrote, have C.. been uniformly
sustained as valid."39
There is a close parallel between the restraint in these cases and a
territorial restriction in a sale of goods by a manufacturer who does his
own wholesaling or retailing in the reserved area. In that situation the
manufacturer, like the seller of the steamship, is protecting his retained
business from the competition of the purchaser. This eliminates poten-
tial competition between supplier and distributor. But that is precisely
what happens when part of a business is sold subject to a restrictive
covenant given by the buyer.
Does it make any difference if the manufacturer elects not to perform
any part of the wholesaling or retailing function himself but to rely on
several independent distributors? The effect of a series of territorial
restrictions in these circumstances would be to prevent competition
between persons at a level in the hierarchy of distribution once removed
from the manufacturer, rather than simply between manufacturer and
wholesaler or retailer. But it is still the business of the manufacturer
that is being protected. He wants to maximize his sales and he thinks
this goal can be best served if his representatives concentrate on their
local opposition rather than battle each other. Hence, the rationale of
the common law rule which permits a seller of property to secure a
covenant not to compete is equally apposite here.
While the courts have not analyzed the problem in these terms, they
have, nevertheless, applied a rule of reason to the use of territorial
restrictions in the marketing of goods. ° In classifying the restraint as
reasonable, they have stressed the non-monopolistic position of the
manufacturer and the presence of ample competition at that level4 1-
public found the balsam efficacious, they were interested in not being deprived of
its use, but by whom it was sold was unimportant.
131 U.S. at 97.
38 Tri-Continental Financial Corp. v. Tropical Marine Enterprises, Inc., 265 F.2d 619
(5th Cir. 1959).
39 Id. at 625.
40 See cases cited in notes 32 and 33 supra.
41 Boro Hall Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 124 F.2d 822 (2d Cir.), rehearing denied,
130 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1942), cert denied, 317 U.S. 695 (1943); Phillips v. Iola Portland
Cement Co., 125 Fed. 593 (8th Cir. 1903), cert. denied, 192 U.S. 606 (1904); Cole Motor
Car Co. v. Hurst, 228 Fed. 280 (5th Cir. 1915), writ of error denied sub nom. Tillar v.
Cole Motor Car Co., 246 Fed. 831 (5th Cir. 1917), cert. denied, 247 U.S. 511 (1918).
1960)
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
the implication being that the result might well be different if the re-
striction were obtained by a monopolist.42
The first reported case in the federal courts involving this type of
restraint reached the Eighth Circuit in 1903.1 A manufacturer sold
cement under a contract precluding the buyer from selling outside of
Texas. In holding that the provision did not run afoul of the Sherman
Act, the court declared that the manufacturer had no monopoly, that
it was surrounded by competing manufacturers, and that the restraint
did not have any substantial effect on competition. 44 Twelve years later
the Fifth Circuit upheld a similar restriction imposed by an automobile
manufacturer on its exclusive agent for certain counties in Texas.45
Emphasizing the ". . multitude of other companies from whom pur-
chasers can readily obtain motor cars. . .", and the fact that they, too,
utilized this "ordinary instrumentality" of distribution, the court thought
it "obvious" that the challenged arrangement was not inimical to com-
petition.46  The following year the newly created Federal Trade Com-
mission issued a Conference Ruling placing its stamp of approval on
the practice.4" In 1932 the Commission reaffirmed its original stand in
a case involving a leading cigar manufactuer who had allocated restricted
territories to 46 independent wholesalers and had assigned all its re-
maining markets to 17 wholly-owned wholesalers.48 Ten years later, in
the Second Circuit's Boro Hall decision,49 ancillary geographical limi-
tations were again labelled reasonable restraints under the Sherman Act.
In this case a Chevrolet dealer sought treble damages because General
Motors had forbidden it to establish a used car salesroom beyond its
designated "zone of influence" in downtown Brooklyn.50 Since the mar-
ket was highly competitive, Judge Augustus Hand saw no reason why
42 The only jurisdiction that has condemned all territorial restrictions, irrespective of
the market position of the manufacturer, is Texas, and there the condemnation is the result
of a special antitrust statute. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 7428 (1948).
43 Phillips v. Iola Portland Cement Co., 125 Fed. 593 (8th Cir. 1903), cert. denied, 192
U.S. 606 (1904). Earlier federal cases involved territorial restrictions ancillary to a sale
of part of a business, Oregon'Steam Navigation Co. v. Winsor, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 64 (1874),
or a secret process, Fowle v. Park, 131 U.S. 88 (1889), rather than a sale of goods.
44 Phillips v. Iola Portland Cement Co., 125 Fed. 593, 595 (8th Cir. 1903), cert. denied,
192 U.S. 606 (1904).
45 Cole Motor Car Co. v. Hurst, 228 Fed. 280, 283 (5th Cir. 1915), writ of error denied
sub nom. Tillar v. Cole Motor Car Co., 246 Fed. 831 (5th Cir. 1917), cert. denied, 247
U.S. 511 (1918). The court found that the agreement was one of consignment, not of
sale, and, therefore, held that the restraints were permissible on that ground as well.
46 228 Fed. at 284.
47 Conference Ruling No. 13, 1 F.T.C. 543 (1916). See also Conference Rulings Nos. 15,
21, 1 F.T.C. 543, 544 (1916).
48 General Cigar Co., Inc., Dkt. 1879, 16 F.T.C. 537 (1932).
49 Boro Hall Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 124 F.2d 822 (2d Cir.), rehearing denied,
130 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 695 (1943).
50 The Chevrolet dealer was free to sell used cars anywhere. The restriction related to
the establishment of a used car salesroom outside of the allotted territory.
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the manufacturer "should not be allowed to fix a location for the sale
of used cars at a place that did not unduly affect other dealers."'"
After Boro Hall was handed down in 1942, the process of adjudicating
the legality of territorial restraints ground to a halt. Despite the absence
of any prior judicial declaration of invalidity, it was not long before the
Department of Justice launched a campaign against the practice. In
1949 it advised the automobile companies that it took a dim view of
inhibiting dealers from operating beyond prescribed territories."2 As a
result, the manufacturers revised their franchise agreements to delete
the challenged clause. 3 Subsequent consent decrees, although permitting
the assignment of primary areas of responsibility to distributors, pro-
hibit any agreement to refrain from selling outside their allotted ter-
ritories."
On what legal theory is the government proceeding in taking a position
so clearly at odds with the decided cases? Certainly, it is relying upon
the statement by the Supreme Court in Bausch & Lomb that unless a
seller acts under fair trade legislation, he "may not lawfully limit by
agreement, express or implied, the price at which or the persons to whom
its purchaser may resell." 55 Bausch & Lomb, however, did not involve
territorial restraints--or even customer limitations standing alone. What
the Court struck down was an intricate marketing system that was rid-
51 124 F.2d at 823.
52 See Hearings on Automobile Marketing Legislation Before a Subcommittee of the
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 89, 362 (1955).
53 Ibid.
54 See United States v. Bostitch, Inc., 1958 Trade Cas. if 69,207 (D.R.I. 1958); United
States v. American Type Founders Co., 1958 Trade Cas. if 69,065 (D.N.J. 1958); United
States v. Rudolph Wurlitzer Co., 1958 Trade Cas. if 69,011 (W.D.N.Y. 1958); United States
v. Necchi Sewing Machine Sales Corp., 1958 Trade Cas. if 68,957 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); United
States v. AMI Inc., 1957 Trade Cas. if 68,758 (W.D. Mich. 1957); United States v. J. P.
Seeburg Corp., 1957 Trade Cas. if 68,613 (ND). Ill. 1957); United States v. Philco Corp.,
1956 Trade Cas. if 68,409 (E.D. Pa. 1956).
The provisions in the Philco order are typical. The defendant was enjoined from entering
into any agreement ". . . limiting or restricting, directly or indirectly, the persons to whom
or the territory within which any wholesale distributor or retail dealer may choose to sell
Philco products." Philco, however, was permitted to ". . . exercise its right to choose and
select its distributors and customers and to designate geographical areas in which such
distributors shall respectively be primarily responsible for wholesaling Philco products and
to terminate the franchises of distributors who do not adequately represent Philco and
promote the sale of all Philco products in areas so designated as their primary respon-
sibility." 1956 Trade Cas. at 71,753.
The Wurlitzer consent judgment contained the following variation of the "primary
responsibility" provision:
Wurlitzer may exercise its right from time to time to choose and select its
distributors and customers and to designate geographical areas within which a dis-
tributor may agree to devote his best efforts to the sale of coin-operated phonographs
and may terminate the contract of any distributor who may fail to devote his best
efforts to the sale in the area so designated of coin-operated phonographs manufactured
by Wurlitzer or to represent Wurlitzer adequately in said area, and the designation of
geographical areas for such specified purposes only shall not be considered a violation
of this section IV.
1958 Trade Cas. at 74,008.
55 United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 721 (1944).
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died with illegal resale price fixing agreements. As part and parcel of
this price maintenance scheme, wholesalers had been limited to selling
to retailers, and retailers to the public.
If the broad dictum of the Court is taken out of context and given
a literal interpretation-namely, that a seller cannot by agreement limit
"the persons to whom its purchaser may resell"-any restriction on a
buyer of goods would be unlawful per se. This would be true even if
the agreement were an isolated one between a single distributor and an
insignificant manufacturer trying to break into a local market. The
fact that a territorial limitation under these circumstances would not
have the slightest adverse effect on competition would be entirely beside
the point. Like price fixing, the restraint would permit of no justifi-
cation. If the Supreme Court intended to lay down any such rule of
total prohibition in Bausch & Lomb, it hardly seems possible that it
would have overturned settled doctrine in such elliptical fashion. 6
The Department of Justice is apparently proceeding on a second
theory as well. When a manufacturer enters into agreements with sev-
eral distributors barring them from marketing his product outside their
respective territories, obviously the effect is to eliminate competition
at the distributor level in the manufacturer's products. If the distrib-
utors had agreed among themselves to achieve this allocation of terri-
tories, it would constitute a conspiracy to divide markets and a per se
violation of the Sherman Act.17 It may be argued, then, that the legality
of a division of territories should not depend on whether it springs from
a multiplicity of separate vertical agreements between a manufacturer
and his dealers, or from a horizontal understanding among the dealers;
either way, the effect on competition is identical. A similar argument
was advanced by the Supreme Court when it outlawed vertical resale
price maintenance in the Dr. Miles Medical case:". . . the ... [manu-
facturer] can fare no better with its plan of identical contracts than
could the dealers themselves if they formed a combination and endeav-
ored to establish the same restrictions, and thus to achieve the same
result, by agreement with each other."59
56 It is significant that Judge Rifkind, the author of Bausch & Lomb in the District
Court, saw no reason even to note the case in an article he later wrote on territorial
restraints after leaving the bench. Rifkind, Division of Territories, in How to Comply
with the Antitrust Laws 127 (1954).
57 Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 596 (1951); United States
v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 328 (1947), affirming 63 F. Supp. 513, 523 (S.D.N.Y.
1945); Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 241 (1899), modifying
85 Fed. 271, 291 (6th Cir. 1898); United States v. Holophane Co., 119 F. Supp. 114, 119
(S.D. Ohio 1954), aff'd per curiam, 352 U.S. 903 (1956); see Montana-Dakota Utilities Co.
v. Williams Electric Cooperative, Inc., 263 F.2d 431, 434 (8th Cir. 1959).
58 Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
59 Id. at 408. There is also the danger that where a network of restrictive territorial
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But this reasoning is not ineluctably a sound basis for decision.60
There are many areas of antitrust where the effect of a transaction is
not dispositive of its legality. A manufacturer and dealer may not agree
on resale prices, but the franchise of the dealer may be terminated if
he cuts prices contrary to the wishes of his supplier."' A group of mo-
tion picture distributors violate the Sherman Act if they concertedly
refuse to grant an exhibitor first-run films, but the deprivation is lawful
if each distributor acts independently02l A corporation may not be able
to expand its operations by merger and still be free to achieve the same
result by internal growth.0 3 By the same token, a naked covenant not
to compete is not the same thing as a covenant not to compete ancillary
to a sale.
In the final analysis, the question boils down to this: Are territorial
restrictions so intrinsically injurious to competition as to warrant un-
qualified condemnation? The acknowledged need for orderly marketing
and recognition of the efficacy of inter-brand competition prompted the
courts to sustain this restraint. A territorial limitation, no less than an
exclusive franchise, may contain the seeds from which more intense
competition may be spawned. While Packard and Schwing were con-
cerned with the correlative restraint preventing the seller from dealing
with more than one buyer in a designated territory, the philosophy of
these cases is equally apt where it is the buyer who is restrained.6 4
agreements exists, even if the court were inclined to uphold separate vertical agreements,
it might infer a conspiracy among the dealers to divide territories with the manufacturer as
the hub. Cf. United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942). Whether or not such
a horizontal agreement could be implied in any given case, of course, would depend on
the facts. Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954).
00 It was, however, adopted by Judge Mack in 1917 when he charged a jury that a
network of territorial allocations transgressed the Sherman Act. Lowe Motor Supplies Co.
v. -Weed Chain Tire Grip Co., Trade Reg. Rep. II 5506, p. 537 (S.D.N.Y. 1917). The case
itself is distinguishable on its facts, since it involved a refusal by a manufacturer and its
local distributor to deal with a price-cutter as part of an illegal conspiracy to fix resale
prices.
01 Compare United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919), with Federal Trade
Commission v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922). See also United States v.
Parke, Davis & Co., 164 F. Supp. 827 (D.D.C. 1958), probable jurisdiction noted, 359 U.S.
903 (1959).
62 Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954).
103 Corporate stock and asset acquisitions are controlled by Section 7 of the Clayton Act.
Such an acquisition violates the statute if there is a reasonable probability that it will
result in a substantial lessening of competition in the relevant market. United States v.
E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957). But Section 7 has no application to
internal growth. Neither does Section 1 of the Sherman Act, since the requisite plurality
of actors is lacking. Hence, unless the growth is achieved in such a way as to constitute
an attempt to monopolize or monopolization in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act,
it is immune from antitrust attack.
64 The Federal Trade Commission recently intimated as much in Columbus Coated
Fabrics Corp., FTC Dkt. 6677, Trade Reg. Rep. ff 27,906, p. 36,964 (1959). The respond-
ents, a manufacturer and two distributors of a washable wall covering, were charged
with violating Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act by conspiring to boycott
certain dealers, fix dealer resale prices, and establish exclusive sales territories for dis-
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In Schwing, the court was perfectly willing to assume that the exclu-
sive selling agreement "gives the dealer a monopoly in handling the
product of the particular manufacturer in a given area, and thereby
enables the dealer to dictate the price at which the products of that
manufacturer shall be sold in that area, subject to competition with
the products of other manufacturers. .. 2"5 Territorial curbs on the
dealer do no more. The dealer may control his own selling price without
coping with other dealers marketing the same brand, but he is still
"subject to competition with the products of other manufacturers." 6
So long as that competition is healthy, the restraint will not appreciably
diminish competitive activity in the market as a whole. And since the
practice has a legitimate business purpose-strengthening the manu-
facturer's channels of distribution-this is just the type of arrangement
which the rule of reason was designed to shelter.
LIMITING THE PERSONS TO WHOM THE BUYER MAY RESELL
In selecting a method of distribution, a manufacturer may desire to
reserve certain key customers for direct sale and employ independent
wholesalers to solicit the rest of the trade. Or he may elect to sell
exclusively to distributors and leave it to them to call upon the retailer.
Sometimes it may even be advantageous for him to have different dis-
tributors concentrate on different types of accounts. Then again, he
may ignore the intermediate wholesale level and deal only with retail
dealers. These and variant patterns of distribution have given rise to
contracts of sale limiting the class of customers to whom the purchaser
may resell, or preventing any resale at all by a consumer. Such agree-
ments have the same impetus as the geographical restriction on the
buyer, give rise to similar antitrust problems, and, despite cases up-
tributors. The Commission sustained the boycott charge but dismissed the other two for
failure of proof. With respect to the claim of unlawful territorial security, it found that
the manufacturer had assigned sales areas to certain of its distributors and had requested
them not to sell elsewhere; that "In practice, a dealer receiving an order from outside his
designated area sends it to . . . [the manufacturer] which, in turn, forwards it to the
appropriately located dealer"; that this policy was prompted by the manufacturer's desire
... to encourage promotional work (including shows and advertising) by assuring the
distributor that he will reap the benefit . . ." and ". . . to insure efficient handling of
complaints": but that there was no agreement as to these geographical allocations. Ibid.
Having said that there was no agreement, the Commission could have stopped right there.
But it went out of its way to add: "There is no evidence of any threat to monopolize, or
of injury to competition. The legality of the arrangement presented here is indicated by
cases such as Schwing Motor Company v. Hudson Sales Corporation, 138 F. Supp. 899;
Packard Motor Car Company v. Webster Motor Car Company, 243 F.2d 418, et seq."
Ibid.
85 138 F. Supp. at 903. The court tacitly assumed that there would be no invasion of
the Baltimore market by a more distantly located Hudson dealer.
06 Ibid.
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holding these restraints under the rule of reason, are opposed by the
Department of Justice.
The common law justification for curtailing the buyer's choice of
customers is, once again, the reasonableness of safeguarding the seller's
business in the face of effective competition from other brands. The
restraint is simply one more species of the traditional covenant not
to compete by the purchaser of property. It is quite true that this ap-
plication of the rule clashes with the general principle of law favoring
the alienability of personal property once it is transferred to the buyer.6 7
For that matter, so does the territorial restriction interfere with free
alienation. But most courts have resolved the conflict by carving out
an exception where the resale restriction is reasonable.08
The Supreme Court has yet to pass upon the validity of a restraint
on customer selection when not contaminated by a nexus with an un-
lawful resale price fixing program. For this reason, Bausch & Lomb is
not dispositive of the question. 9 Back in 1915 the Court held that a
provision in a contract of sale that the goods were for the buyer's
consumption, and not for resale, was not "inherently illegal" so as to
preclude the seller from recovering the purchase price. 70 But the opinion
was confined to this narrow holding and did not explore the reasonable-
ness of the agreement under the Sherman Act. Later, however, two fed-
eral Courts of Appeals considered similar covenants restricting the
purchaser's right of resale and held that they did not contravene the
statute.
71
Thus, in the Fosburgh case,72 a contract for the sale of sugar con-
tained a clause that the buyer, a candy manufacturer, would use it for
manufacturing purposes only and not for resale. The Ninth Circuit,
impressed by the fact that the purpose of the provision was to assure
equitable distribution of the available supply during a period of severe
shortage, concluded that there was no undue restraint of trade. Needless
to say, if customer restrictions were illegal per se, the fact that economic
67 See generally, Chafee, "The Music Goes Round and Round: Equitable Servitudes and
Chattels," 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1250 (1956); Chafee, "Equitable Servitudes on Chattels," 41
Harv. L. Rev. 945 (1928).
68 See cases cited in notes 32, 33 supra and notes 71, 76, 78, 80 infra. Whenever a
seller disposes of part of his business subject to a covenant not to compete, he is to some
extent impairing the alienability of the property in the buyer's hands. For the next
prospective purchaser may not want to be similarly encumbered. But this consideration
has never led to invalidation of the covenant.
69 See text at note 55 supra.
70 D. R. Wilder Mfg. Co. v. Corn Products Refining Co., 236 U.S. 165 (1915).
71 Chicago Sugar Co. v. American Sugar Refining Co., 176 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1949),
cert. denied, 338 U.S. 948 (1950); Fosburgh v. California & Hawaiian Sugar Refining Co.,
291 Fed. 29 (9th Cir. 1923).
72 Fosburgh v. California & Hawaiian Sugar Refining Co., 291 Fed. 29 (9th Cir. 1923).
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conditions made the practice expedient would not save it from invali-
dation.73  Moreover, in the Chicago Sugar case,74 the Seventh Circuit
subsequently upheld the same type of prohibition on resale as a reason-
able marketing device without any showing of economic disturbances.
The court felt that the restriction was reasonable because, without it,
sugar sold by the refiner to consuming manufacturers could have been
resold in competition with the distributing trade.73
The Revlon case 6 in New York exemplifies the use of resale restric-
tions in connection with a dual system of distribution. The plaintiff, a
manufacturer of cosmetics, sold direct to retail stores throughout the
country. In addition, it sold to jobbers under contracts limiting each to
a specific territory and to resale to beauty parlors and beauty schools.
The defendant, a retailer who knew of these limitations, induced a jobber
to sell to him directly. Holding that the contract did not restrain trade
in violation of the antitrust laws and that an action for inducing its
breach would lie, the court stated:
It is well recognized that a manufacturer need not go into competition
against himself. If he elects to deal with a certain class of customers
personally he can not be required to allow those to whom he sells for
distribution to compete with him for those customers.77
That there is no categorical rule against resale restrictions is further
illustrated by several decisions, federal and state, permitting sellers to
require their customers to dispose of the purchased goods in export chan-
nels only. 78 And a host of state cases, which arose during the car shortage
following World War II, sustained agreements preventing purchasers
of new cars from reselling them for a limited period of time without
first offering them to the dealer at a stipulated price.79 These rulings are
73 See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); Virginia Excelsior
Mills, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 256 F.2d 538 (4th Cir. 1958).
74 Chicago Sugar Co. v. American Sugar Refining Co., 176 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1949), cert.
denied, 338 U.S. 948 (1950).
75 Though Bausch & Lomb had been on the books for five years, the Seventh Circuit did
not mention it.
76 Revlon Products Corp. v. Bernstein, 204 Misc. 80, 119 N.Y.S.2d 60 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1953), aff'd, 285 App. Div. 1139, 142 N.Y.S.2d 364 (1st Dep't 1955).
77 204 Misc. at 81, 119 N.Y.S.2d at 62.
78 United States v. Newbury Mfg. Co., 36 F. Supp. 602 (D. Mass. 1941); P. Lorillard
Co. v. Weingarden, 280 Fed. 238 (W.D.N.Y. 1922); Hickok Mfg. Co. v. Fairley Trading
Corp., 117 N.Y.S.2d 874 (Sup. Ct. 1952). See also Authors & Newspapers Ass'n v.
O'Gorman Co., 147 Fed. 616 (C.C.D.R.I. 1906) (sustaining resale prohibition for one
year in connection with sale of books); Bobbs-Merrill v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908),
where a contrary result was reached, may be distinguished on the ground that it involved
vertical price control after the first sale of the copyrighted work.
79 Piazza v. Liberty Motors, 34 Ala. App. 376, 43 So. 2d 134, aff'd, 253 Ala. 132, 43
So. 2d 136 (1949); Summers v. Adams Motor Co., 34 Ala. App. 319, 39 So. 2d 300
(1949); Bay Shore Motors v. Baker, 90 Cal. App. 2d 895, 202 P.2d 865 (1949); King
Motors v. Delfino, 136 Conn. 496; 72 A.2d 233 (1950); Schuler v. Dearing Chevrolet Co.,
76 Ga. App. 570, 46 S.E.2d 611 (1948) ; Burnett v. Nolen, 336 Ill. App. 376, 84 N.E.2d 155
(1949); Elizabethtown Lincoln Mercury v. Jones, 313 Ky. 321, 231 S.W.2d 42 (1950);
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consonant with the willingness of most state courts to enforce reasonable
use restrictions attached to sales of chattels."0
But an ominous note for orderly marketing was struck this past year
by a federal district judge in the Baldwin-Lima case."' Baldwin, which
had the exclusive right to exploit a patented stress gage having several
distinct commercial uses, sold the product subject to restrictions which
parcelled out different fields of use to various customers. The court
held that the sale removed the transaction from the protection of the
patent, and that the restraints constituted an allocation of markets
among competitors and, hence, a per se violation of the Sherman Act-
despite the absence of any finding of horizontal agreement among Bald-
win's customers. The case, however, is supportable on the alternative
ground that the use restrictions were employed in such a manner as to
result in a tie-in of other apparatus with the patented gage. 2 Indeed, it
was this finding of patent misuse to which the Third Circuit pointed
in its affirmance.8 3
Apparently our antitrust enforcement agencies do not see eye to eye
on curtailing a buyer's right of customer selection. The attitude of the
Department of Justice is clear. It argues that such a restraint is un-
lawful per se under Bausch & Lomb.8 4 Not only is this evident from
Wade & Dunton, Inc. v. Gordon, 144 Me. 49, 64 A.2d 422 (1949); Stanford Motor Co. v.
Westman, 151 Neb. 850, 39 N.W.2d 841 (1949); Larson Buick Co. v. Mosca, 79 N.Y.S.2d
654 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1948) ; Thomas B. Martindale, Inc. v. Gorman, 165 Pa. Super.
612, 70 A.2d 409 (1950); Thomas B. Martindale, Inc. v. Dougherty, 68 D. & C. 243
(Pa. C.P. 1949); Becker-Mills, Inc. v. Bosher, 68 D. & C. 115 (Pa. Mun. Ct. 1949).
80 E.g., Meyer v. Estes, 164 Mass. 457, 41 N.E. 683 (1895) (sale of electrotype plates
to be used only to illustrate the works of specified publishers and not to be resold or
multiplied for purposes of resale); Gano v. Delmas, 140 Miss. 323, 105 So. 535 (1925)
(sale of cement for a particular road project and not for resale); Clare v. Ice Cream
Cabinet Co., 166 Aft. 722 (N.J. Ch. 1933) (sale of refrigerator to confectioner who
promised to use it solely to store Reid ice cream); New York Bank Note Co. v. Hamilton
Bank Note Engraving & Printing Co., 180 N.Y. 280, 73 N.E. 48 (1905) (printing presses
to be sold with restriction against use in strip-ticket printing); see National Skee-Ball Co.
v. Seyfried, 110 N.J. Eq. 18, 158 At. 736 (1932) (condition in sale of skee-ball alleys that
buyers confine their use to places where no similar alleys were in use not binding on a
subsequent purchaser with notice of the condition although condition might have been
valid between the immediate parties). But cf. Elijah & Winne v. Mottinger, 161 Iowa 371,
142 N.W. 1038 (1913) (condition in sale of horse and wagon requiring vendee to use
only to deliver coal for vendor in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, and containing no time limitation,
held void as perpetual restriction on future use or alienation of property). Contra, Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 59-805 (1943) (prohibiting sale of any article upon condition that it not be
sold again, or any restraint on sale by purchaser).
81 Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp. v. Tatnall Measuring Systems Co., 169 F. Supp. 1
(E.D. Pa. 1958), aff'd, 268 F.2d 395 (3d Cir. 1959).
82 The District Court termed this "a more basic vice" than the allocation of markets.
169 F. Supp. at 30.
83 Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp. v. Tatnall Measuring Systems Co., 268 F.2d 395 (3d
Cir. 1959).
84 Parenthetically, it may be noted that the Department might, with equal plausibility,
rely on Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940), where the Supreme
Court also condemned customer restrictions which were an integral part of a plan to
control resale prices. Accord, Masters, Inc. v. Sunbeam Corp., 112 F. Supp. 268 (S.D.N.Y.
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recent consent decrees,85 but the Department made its views known in
1949 when it induced the automobile companies to eliminate a clause
from their franchise agreements which prevented resale of new cars to
non-franchised dealers-a practice known as "bootlegging."8 6 And when
the automobile industry subsequently sought a special exemption from
Congress in 1954 authorizing such a restrictive provision, the Depart-
ment resisted the measure on the ground that it would sanction three
separate antitrust violations: (1) artificial stabilization of prices for
new motor vehicles in the face of "price-cutting" by "bootleggers";
(2) a boycott of "bootleggers"; and (3) restrictions on products after
sale to dealers who took independent title to the vehicles.87 The bill
passed the House,88 but never emerged from the Senate.
If customer restrictions are employed to implement a system of resale
price maintenance, and the program is not under the aegis of fair trade,
Bausch & Lomb and kindred cases89 make it abundantly clear that the
Sherman Act is violated. In such a situation the words of Mr. Justice
Lurton, written when he was a judge on the Sixth Circuit, would be
pertinent: "Restraints which might be upheld if ancillary to some
principal contract cannot be enforced if, when unmasked, they appear
to be the main purpose of the contract and not subordinate.""0 But it
certainly cannot be presumed from the mere presence of a clause re-
stricting customer selection that there is an agreement to fix pricesf1
To analyze the problem of customer restrictions in terms of a boycott
1952); W. H. Hill Co. v. Gray & Worcester, 163 Mich. 12, 127 N.W. 803 (1910). See
also United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942).
85 E.g., United States v. Bostitch, Inc., 1958 Trade Cas. ff 69,207, p. 74,741 (D.R.I.
1958); United States v. American Type Founders Co., 1958 Trade Cas. ff 69,065, p. 74,205(D.N.J. 1958); United States v. American Body and Trailer, Inc., 1958 Trade Cas. ff 69,063,
p. 74,200 (W.D. Okla. 1958); United States v. Rudolph Wurlitzer Co., 1958 Trade Cas.
f 69,011, p. 74,007 (W.D-N.Y. 1958); United States v. Necchi Sewing Machine Sales Corp.,
1958 Trade Cas. 1 68,957, p. 73,841 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); United States v. AMI Inc., 1957
Trade Cas. ff 68,758, p. 73,099 (W.D. Mich. 1957); United States v. J. P. Seeburg Corp.,
1957 Trade Cas. ff 68,613, p. 72,479 (N.D. IlM. 1957); United States v. Philco Corp., 1956
Trade Cas. f1 68,409, p. 71,753 (E.D. Pa. 1956); United States v. Reddi-Wip, Inc., 1955
Trade Cas. 1 68,187, p. 70,877 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
86 See, Hearings on Automobile Marketing Legislation Before a Subcommittee of the
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 89 (1955).
Typically, the nonfranchised dealer or "bootlegger" obtains his cars from an overstocked
franchised dealer and drives them to another city, where he advertises them "same as new"
for much less than list prices.
87 Hearings on Agreements Restricting Certain Sales of Motor Vehicles for Resale
Before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
5-6 (1954).
88 H.R. Rep. No. 9769, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).
89 See note 84 supra. See also Victor Talking Machine Co. v. Kemeny, 271 Fed. 810
(3d Cir. 1921).
90 This point was made in John D. Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman, 153 Fed. 24, 45 (6th
Cir. 1907), the forerunner of the Dr. Miles case. The "main purpose" which the Sixth
Circuit referred to was "to benefit . . . (the manufacturer's] vendees and subvendees by
breaking down their competition with each other." "Any benefit to the retained business"
of the manufacturer, the court felt, was incidental to this primary objective. Ibid.
91 Roux Distributing Co., FTC Dkt. 6636, Trade Reg. Rep. ff 27,855 (1959).
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seems quite strained 2 Though group boycotts are unlawful per se, 8
the term connotes a refusal to deal stemming from a horizontal agree-
ment among competitors, not a vertical arrangement between seller and
buyer. If a dealer's promise to a manufacturer, that he will resell only
to consumers, is deemed a boycott of other dealers, by a parity of
reasoning a manufacturer's promise to grant a dealer an exclusive fran-
chise is equally a boycott of other dealers. Yet it was precisely this
line of argument that the courts rejected in Schwing and Packard when
they refused to treat an exclusive selling agreement as an unlawful
vertical conspiracy." Even more recently, when the Supreme Court
reiterated in the Klor's case that group boycotts are illegal as a matter
of law, Mr. Justice Black was careful to draw a distinction between
such a collective restraint and "a manufacturer and a dealer agreeing
to an exclusive distributorship.) 95
Although the Federal Trade Commission also opposed the anti-boot-
legging bill in 1954 because it interfered with the right of an individual
trader to select his customers,96 this agency does not subscribe to the
proposition that customer restrictions are illegal per se. The question
was presented to the Commission last year in the Roux case.9r The
respondent, which sold beauty preparations, channeled the distribution
of its products through three groups: jobbers, drug wholesalers and
92 This analysis, in all probability, was suggested to the government by the reference to
Fashion Originators' Guild v. Federal Trade Comm., 312 U.S. 457 (1941), in Bausch
& Lomb:
A distributor of a trade-marked article may not lawfully limit by agreement, express
or implied, the price at which or the person to whom its purchaser may resell, except
as the seller moves along the route which is marked by the Miller-Tydings Act ...
Even the additional protection of a copyright . . . or of a patent ... add nothing to
a distributor's power to control prices of resale by a purchaser. The same thing is
true as to restriction of customers. Fashion Originators' Guild v. Trade Comm'n, 312
U.S. 457, 465....
321 U.S. at 721.
Since Fashion Originators' Guild held that a concerted refusal to deal by a group was
unlawful per se, the Department of Justice would presumably argue that the requisite
concert of action may be found in the mere agreement between a manufacturer and his
dealer restricting the latter's right of customer selection-even though the manufacturer
himself does not agree to refrain from dealing with those customers who are outside the
franchise of the dealer.
93 Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
94 This does not negate the possibility that where there is a multiplicity of agreements
between a manufacturer and his dealers containing customer restrictions, a court might
conclude that the arrangements were in fact the product of a conspiracy among the dealers
in which the manufacturer participated. See note 59, supra. If that factual determination
were made, the horizontal allocation of customers would be unlawful. See note 57, supra.
The discussion in the text presupposes that each contract between manufacturer and
dealer is separately negotiated and that there is no agreement among the dealers themselves.
95 359 U.S. at 212.
96 Hearings on Agreements Restricting Certain Sales of Motor Vehicles for Resale Before
the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1954).
The Commission also felt that the proposed legislation was unnecessary because 4"boot-
legging" could be controlled by comporting with fair trade laws.
97 Roux Distributing Co., note 91, supra.
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beauty supply dealers. Jobbers were confined to selling to the other two
groups;98 drug wholesalers were to cultivate the drug and department
store trade; and beauty supply dealers were to obtain business only
from beauty salons and the like. In holding that this method of distri-
bution was not proscribed by the antitrust laws,9 9 the Commission spe-
cifically distinguished Bausch & Lomb because of its price-fixing aspects
and cited the Sugar cases with approval. 0 0
However, the Roux decision seems to rest on the curious basis that
there was no showing that "drug wholesalers and beauty supply dealers,
the two principal classes of customers involved, were ever in substantial
competition" with each other.' 0 ' For this reason the Commission failed
to see how the restraint on customer selection might substantially lessen
competition. This implies that customer limitations would pass muster
if employed by a manufacturer setting up a distributing organization
for the first time, but not if used to revise an existing marketing system
under which distributors had been competing with each other for the
same accounts. Such a partial concession to legality, of course, would
have limited practical value.
It is difficult to see why a distinction should be drawn depending on
whether the competition being avoided is potential or actual. If there
are sound reasons for preventing the rise of intra-brand competition
in the first place, they apply with equal force to its eradication. The
fact that an exclusive selling franchise may have the effect of severing
existing dealers-rather than merely preventing their appointment-
does not make for illegality." 2 The same rule should apply to customer
restrictions. Unless it can be said that the restraint will significantly
diminish the vitality of competition in the relevant market, it should
be permitted as reasonably calculated to strengthen the hand of the
manufacturer in competing with others. As in the case of the territorial
limitation, this is an area where glib references to the elimination of
competition tend to obscure the pro-competitive features of the restric-
tion.
98 Jobbers were also permitted to sell to each other-presumably on an exchange basis.
99 The complaint was brought for alleged violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, which interdicts "unfair methods of competition." The Commission
expressly recognizes that the statute encompasses practices which do not rise to the level
of a Sherman Act infraction. Hence its holding means that neither statute was violated.
100 Roux Distributing Co., note 91, supra.
101 Id. at pp. 36,925-26.
102 Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 822 (1957); Schwing Motor Co. v. Hudson Sales Corp., 138 F. Supp. 899
(D. Md.), aff'd per curiam, 239 F.2d 176 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 823
(1957).
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REQUIRING THE BUYER TO DEAL EXCLUSIVELY WITH THE SELLER
When a seller of goods goes beyond circumscribing the freedom of
his dealers in marketing his own product and impinges on their right
to handle the wares of his competitors, his problem becomes more dif-
ficult. Once he requires his outlets, by express contract or implied
understanding, to purchase his merchandise to the exclusion of rival
brands, not only must he satisfy the general command of the Sherman
Law, but also the more specific and exacting requirements of the Clayton
Act. °3 Even if the buyer's exclusive dealing promise does not rise to
the level of an unreasonable restraint of trade, it may nevertheless
substantially lessen competition within the meaning of Section 3 of the
1914 enactment. This renders quite academic the common law indulg-
ence of exclusive dealing arrangements' and their early history under
the Sherman Act.0 5 Today, when a sale of goods is involved,106 and
303 Section 3 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods, wares, merchandise,
machinery, supplies, or other commodities, whether patented or unpatented, for use,
consumption or resale within the United States or any Territory thereof or the
District of Columbia or any insular possession or other place under the jurisdiction of
the United States, or fix a price charged therefor, or discount from, or rebate upon,
such price, on the condition, agreement, or understanding that the lessee or purchaser
thereof shall not use or deal in the goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies,
or other commodities of a competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, where the
effect of such lease, sale, or contract for sale or such condition, agreement or under-
standing may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly
in any line of commerce.
38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1958).
104 At common law the vast majority of exclusive dealing agreements were sustained.
See, e.g., Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Texas & Pacific Ry., 11 Fed. 625 (C.C.E.D. Tex. 1882);
National Furnace Co. v. Keystone Mfg. Co., 110 Il. 427 (1884); Brown v. Rounsavell, 78
Ill. 589 (1875); Palmer v. Stebbins, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 188 (1826); Matthews v. Asso-
ciated Press, 136 N.Y. 333, 32 N.E. 981 (1893); Live Stock Ass'n v. Levy, 54 N.Y. Super.
32 (1886); Restatement, Contracts § 516(e) (1932).
105 The earliest decisions involving exclusive dealing under the Sherman Act dealt with
arrangements which did not expressly bind the purchaser to deal exclusively with one
seller or to refrain from dealing with others, but merely induced him to eschew competing
goods by offering him price rebates or discounts as an incentive. In this form, the courts
could discern neither a contract nor a restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Act.
Whitwell v. Continental Tobacco Co., 125 Fed. 454 (8th Cir. 1903); In re Coming, 51
Fed. 205 (N.D. Ohio 1892); In re Terrell, 51 Fed. 213 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1892); In re Greene,
52 Fed. 104 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1892). It was because of this body of law that Congress felt
that the Sherman Act did not effectively cope with the problem of exclusive dealing. 51
Cong. Rec. 9161 (1914); see Dictograph Products, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 217
F.2d 821, 826 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 940 (1955). Yet where exclusive deal-
ing was the result of express contract, it was condemned because of excessive duration in
United States Telephone Co. v. Central Union Telephone Co., 202 Fed. 66 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 229 U.S. 620 (1913) ; because it was used by a monopolist to drive out com-
petition in United States v. Great Lakes Towing Co., 208 Fed. 733 (N.D. Ohio 1913), modi-
fied, 217 Fed. 656 (N.D. Ohio 1914), appeal dismissed, 245 U.S. 675 (1917); and because
the exclusive was part and parcel of price-fixing or boycott schemes. Standard Sanitary
Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20, 46-49 (1912); Continental Wall Paper Co. v. Louis
Voight & Sons Co., 212 U.S. 227 (1909); Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U.S. 38 (1904);
Wheeler-Stenzel Co. v. National Window Glass Jobbers' Ass'n, 152 Fed. 864 (3d Cir. 1907);
Chesapeake & Ohio Fuel Co. v. United States, 115 Fed. 610 (6th Cir. 1902). No court
during the period antedating the Clayton Act had occasion to adjudicate the legality
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the exclusive dealing arrangement is challenged in a civil action under
both the Sherman and Clayton Acts, the courts frequently predicate
their determination solely on Section 3 and withhold judgment on the
superfluous Sherman Act claim.10 7
While an exclusive dealing agreement restrains the buyer from pa-
tronizing others and narrows the channels of trade open to competing
sellers, it may nonetheless further legitimate economic aims. The seller
hopes to increase his sales and insure superior customer service by re-
quiring his dealers to focus all their efforts on promoting his line. More-
over, it is likely that dealers handling the goods of one supplier will
carry a full stock, rather than a limited number of fast-moving items.
And when one dealer is the sole representative of a manufacturer in
a specific territory, it is particularly important that the dealer devote
his entire energy to pushing that single line. When the "exclusive"
takes the form of a requirements contract, it may enable the seller to
reduce selling expenses, protect himself against price fluctuations, obtain
a predictable market and perhaps even establish a foothold against en-
trenched competitors.108
Nevertheless, these cogent business reasons failed to sway a five
member majority of the Supreme Court in Standard Stations109 Ex-
pressing the fear that the judiciary was not qualified to conduct an
economic inquiry to determine the probable effect of exclusive dealing
agreements on competition, the Court fashioned a rule bordering on
per se illegality. Section 3 is violated, it held, whenever "competition
has been foreclosed in a substantial share of the line of commerce
affected."" 0  Such unlawful foreclosure followed automatically from
under the Sherman Act of an express exclusive dealing agreement of reasonable duration
when not accompanied by any extrinsic unlawful purpose.
106 By its terms, Section 3 of the Clayton Act applies only to a sale or lease of com-
modities. Thus, where land or a service is involved, only the Sherman Act provides a basis
for challenge. See Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); Times-
Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
107 See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949);
Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 168 F. Supp. 456 (M.D. Tenn. 1958); United
States v. Sun Oil Co., 1959 Trade Cas. ff 69,398 (E.D. Pa. 1959). But cf. United States
v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 18 (N.D. Cal. 1949), discussed note 120, infra.
108 See Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 306-07 (1949).
Mr. Justice Frankfurter also said that exclusive dealing arrangements ". . . may well be of
economic advantage to buyers as well as to sellers, and thus indirectly of advantage to
the consuming public. In the case of the buyer, they may assure supply, afford protection
against rises in price, enable long-term planning on the basis of known costs, and obviate
the expense and risk of storage in the quantity necessary for a commodity having a
fluctuating demand." Id. at 306.
109 Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
110 Id. at 314. While the Supreme Court acknowledged that tying arrangements, as
distinguished from exclusive dealing agreements, "serve hardly any purpose beyond the
suppression of competition" (id. at 305), it declined to apply different standards of legality
under Section 3 to the two restraints. Nevertheless, the Court promulgated a rule of
comparative quantitative substantiality for "exclusives" in Standard Stations when it stressed
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the fact that Standard had requirements contracts with service stations
accounting for 6.7% of gasoline sales in a seven state Western area."'
It made no difference that the defendant did not dominate the market,
that it had not improved its competitive position while its contracts were
operative, and that their term was relatively short. Once it appeared
that the contracts embraced a substantial share of the market, nothing
else mattered.12
A wave of criticism erupted in the wake of this rule of "quantitative
substantiality."" 3 The Attorney General's Committee pointed out that
although the Court had postulated "'foreclosure' of competitors from
a significant market as the index of illegality," it "assumed rather than
demonstrated that Standard's requirements contracts actually 'foreclosed'
competitors from market access."" 4 In dwelling on the elimination of
Standard's retail stations as outlets for its competitors, the Court had ig-
nored the more pertinent question of whether an adequate number of
other equally desirable dealers remained available to competitors. For
if the other oil companies, despite their inability to sell to Standard's
dealers, had good distribution, there could be no substantial lessening
of competition." 5
When the Federal Trade Commission announced its Maico decision""
in 1953, it seemed to some that the tide might be turning. While the
foreclosure from a "substantial share of the line of commerce affected." On the other hand,
under International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947), a tying arrangement
transgresses Section 3 when more than an insignificant or insubstantial quantum of
commerce is involved-in that case, $500,000 worth of salt; in other words, a standard of
absolute quantitative substantiality governs in the case of tie-ins.
According to the Supreme Court's most recent restatement, a tie-in violates the Sherman
Act when there is "sufficient economic power to impose an appreciable restraint on free
competition in the tied product" and a "not insubstantial" amount of commerce is tied;
the Clayton Act is infringed when either condition is present. See Northern Pacific Rail-
way Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 11 (1958).
11' The Court also held that Standard violated Section 3 by entering into "excusives"
with respect to 5% of the lubricating oil and 2% of the tires and batteries sold in the
relevant area.
312 Although the government's complaint alleged that Standard had taken over an undue
concentration of the better service station locations, it offered no substantiation at the
trial. And when Standard attempted to prove that it had not pre-empted the choice sites,
the trial judge rejected its proffer as immaterial. See Brief for Appellants, p. 12, Standard
Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
118 See, e.g., Handier, Antitrust in Perspective c. II (1957); Lockhart & Sacks, "The
Relevance of Economic Factors in Determining Whether Exclusive Arrangements Violate
Section 3 of the Clayton Act," 65 Harv. L. Rev. 913 (1952); McLaren, "Related Problems
of Requirements Contracts and Acquisitions in Vertical Integration Under the Anti-Trust
Laws," 45 III. L. Rev. 141 (1950).
114 Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep. 142 (1955).
115 Since Standard's major competitors also distributed their gasoline under requirements
contracts, it is conceivable that the cumulative foreclosure of retail outlets by the seven
leading oil companies hindered the smaller producers from gaining effective access to the
consumer. But neither the trial judge nor the Supreme Court purported to fasten liability
on Standard because its major competitors, acting independently and not in concert,
chose to engage in similar practices.
116 Maico Co., Dkt. 5822, 50 F.T.C. 485 (1953).
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courts might feel ill-equipped to sift and evaluate relevant economic
data, the Commission, mindful of its raison d'etre, felt no similar inade-
quacy. Hence, it reversed the hearing examiner, who had condemned
Maico's exclusive dealing agreements under the Standard Stations for-
mula; and it ordered him to receive evidence that respondent's com-
petitors had grown in number, that their volume had increased, that
Maico's share of the market had decreased, and that its dealers consti-
tuted a small percentage of hearing aid outlets in the country.117
It soon became apparent, however, that Maico had not ushered in
a new era for exclusive dealing. The courts have not paid the slightest
attention to it,"-" and the Commission is simply patient enough to listen
to the respondent's evidence before finding a violation.119 The cold fact
is that in the past ten years, exclusive dealing agreements have almost
invariably failed to survive judicial or administrative scrutiny under
Section 3.120
117 On remand, Maico consented to an order prohibiting it from enforcing or entering
into exclusive dealing agreements. Maico Co., Dkt. 5822, 51 F.T.C. 1197 (1955).
11s Since Maico, no court has departed from the mechanistic approach sanctioned in
Standard Stations. Dictograph Products, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 217 F.2d 821
(2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 940 (1955); Anchor Serum Co. v. Federal Trade
Commission, 217 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1954); Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 168
F. Supp. 456 (M.D. Tenn. 1958); United States v. Sun Oil Co., 1959 Trade Cas. J 69,398
(E.D. Pa. 1959). They have echoed the rationale of pre-Maico judicial decisions in
Section 3 cases. Automatic Canteen Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 194 F.2d 433 (7th
Cir. 1952), rev'd on other grounds, 346 U.S. 61 (1953); Pennsylvania Water & Power Co.
v. Consolidated Gas, Electric Light & Power Co., 184 F.2d 552 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 340
U.S. 906 (1950); Red Rock Bottlers, Inc. v. Red Rock Cola Co., 1952 Trade Cas.
J 67,375 (N.D. Ga. 1952); see Transamerica Corp. v. Board of Governors, 206 F.2d 163, 170
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 901 (1953). Indeed, the courts in Pennsylvania Water
and Red Rock indicated a willingness to invalidate an exclusive dealing arrangement on
the authority of Standard Stations without even probing the question of quantitative
significance.
"19 Harley-Davidson Motor Co., Dkt. 5698, 50 F.T.C. 1047 (1954); Revlon Products
Corp., Dkt. 5685, 51 F.T.C. 260 (1954), motion to reopen denied, 51 F.T.C. 466 (1954);
Beltone Hearing Aid Co., Dkt. 5825, 52 F.T.C. 830 (1956); Outboard, Marine & Mfg. Co.,
Dkt. 5882, 52 F.T.C. 1553 (1956).
120 The only case since Standard Stations in which a defendant has escaped liability
under Section 3 is United States v. J. I. Case Co., 101 F. Supp. 856 (D. Minn. 1951).
There, judge Nordbye rested his decision on two grounds: (1) that the government failed
as a matter of fact to sustain its charge that the defendant had entered into agreements
with a substantial number of its dealers requiring them to refrain from purchasing farm
machinery from others; and (2) that there was no showing of either actual or probable
substantial lessening of competition, since the government relied on evidence pertaining
to less than one-half of one per cent of the nation's farm equipment dealers.
In United States v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 18 (NJ. Cal. 1949), the court held
that the defendant's five-year requirements contracts unreasonably restrained trade in
violation of the Sherman Act because the dominant power in the industry foreclosed
competitors from a substantial market, namely, $250 million worth of business annually.
The court, however, refused to outlaw all requirements contracts, holding that, in view of
the necessities of the industry, contracts having a duration of one year would be reasonable,
since they ". . . would permit competitive influences to operate at the expiration of said
period of time. . . ." Id. at 31. Oddly enough, without advancing any reason for its action,
the court summarily dismissed the government's contention that the requirements contracts
also offended Section 3 of the Clayton Act. Id. at 32. It held, however, on another
branch of the case, that the defendant had violated Section 3 by the use of tying
restrictions.
THE ORDERLY MARKETING OF GOODS
As far as the courts are concerned, Standard Stations reigns su-
preme. as" This is in marked contrast to their rejection of its doctrine
in antimerger proceedings under Section 7 of the Clayton Act. Despite
the Supreme Court's ruling in duPont-General Motors,2 s judges have
balked at invalidating an acquisition merely because it involves a sub-
stantial share of the market, and have insisted on a factual showing of
probable anticompetitive effects.123 Yet, for some strange reason, they
outlaw an "exclusive" without such proof.
This mechanical approach is graphically illustrated by the recent
decision of the District Court in Sun Oil.s 4 The supply contracts of
Sun Oil Company, unlike those of Standard of California, did not oblige
independent service stations to buy exclusively from Sun, but the trial
judge nevertheless sustained the government's contention that there
was a tacit understanding to that effect. And once that finding was
made, the result was a foregone conclusion. Sun sold 8.4% of the
gasoline through approximately 7.3% of the stations in its eighteen
state market area. Since other suppliers were denied access to this
substantial number of Sunoco outlets, the "exclusives" were ipso facto
unlawful under Standard Stations.
Not only are the findings bereft of any suggestion that Sun's com-
petitors had trouble reaching the consumer, but they imply the contrary.
Over 99% of the branded gasoline purchased by the motoring public
in the relevant market was dispensed at stations which carried the
products of a single supplier. 2 ' Indeed, the court specifically acknowl-
edged that "Sun's marketing practice with respect to gasoline does not
foreclose all its competitors from selling their brand of gasoline at Sun's
independent dealer stations for such competitors choose not to sell to
Sun dealers."'O6 Nor was this choice peculiar to the major oil companies.
The court referred to four small companies which followed the same
policy of dealing primarily with "undivided" stations. Moreover, it
noted that "even new competitors seek to establish their own outlets,
either by erecting new stations or by winning existing wholesale distrib-
121 See note 118 supra.
-22 United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
123 American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., 259 F.2d 524 (2d Cir.
1958); United States v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 169 F. Supp. 888 (S.DMN.Y. 1959);
United States v. Brown Shoe Co., 1956 Trade Cas. ff 68,244 (ED. Mo. 1956); cf. United
States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); see also Transamerica
Corp. v. Board of Governors, 206 F.2d 163 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 901
(1953). The Commission is in accord. Brio Mfg. Co., FTC Dkt. 6557, Trade Reg. Rep.
f 27,243 (1957).
124 United States v. Sun Oil Company, 1959 Trade Cas. 1 69,398 (ED. Pa. 1959).
125 Id. at p. 75,506.
126 Id. at p. 75,511.
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utors or retail dealers from other suppliers."' If there were any small
marketers who were willing but unable to sell their petroleum products
on a split-pump basis at Sunoco stations, the court did not mention them.
The Sun Oil case thus presses Section 3 to the point where a violation
will be conclusively presumed from the denial of access to channels of
distribution which are not desired by the allegedly victimized com-
petitors. As another federal judge recently remarked in upsetting a
requirements contract under Section 3: ". . . the Court's function is
not to determine whether the contract is advantageous or desirable
from the standpoint of the parties or of the public but whether it is
legal."'28 The plain implication of this observation is that the standard
of legality does not necessarily coincide with the public interest.
The Federal Trade Commission, on the other hand, continues to ad-
here to Maico and refuses to endorse the strictly quantitative principle
enunciated in Standard Stations.2 9 Instead, it inquires whether com-
petitors lack access to the market through equally suitable avenues of
distribution. Thus far, however, a finding that the "exclusives" cover
a substantial segment of the market has invariably been accompanied
by a determination that competitors have been foreclosed from the
better outlets and relegated to inferior marketing channels. 80 And once
such qualitative foreclosure is established, the Commission disregards
other economic evidence.
Thus, in the eyes of the Commission, it appears to be no defense that
the industry has witnessed the emergence of new competitors, or that
some companies have flourished despite the exclusive dealing policy,
127 Id. at p. 75,506.
128 Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 168 F. Supp. 456, 463 (M.D. Tenn. 1958)
(emphasis supplied). The contract obligated an electric utility company to purchase all
the coal required at one of its plants in Florida from one supplier for a period of twenty
years. Purchases were expected to be 450,000 tons at first, as compared with total annual
coal consumption of 700,000 tons in all of Peninsular Florida. And much larger purchases
were anticipated by the utility in later years. The court deemed it irrelevant that coal was
a newcomer to the Florida market, accounting for less than 6% of the state's consumption
of fuel and that the use of coal by the buyer ". . . might stimulate the market and induce
other consumers to convert to coal . . ." from oil. Id. at 460. For ". . . the inescapable
fact persists that the Potter-Tampa contract for a period of 20 years excludes competi-
tions of the Seller from a substantial amount of trade . . ." Id. at 461.
129 In an article written prior to his appointment to the Federal Trade Commission,
the present Chairman expressed the hope that the Commission would continue to pursue
this approach. Kintner, "Exclusive Dealing," 3 Prac. Law 69, 76 (1957).
10 Dictograph Products, Inc., Dkt. 5655, 50 F.T.C. 281 (1953), aff'd, 217 F.2d 821 (2d
Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 940 (1955); Harley-Davidson Motor Co., Dkt. 5698, 50
F.T.C. 1047 (1954); Revlon Products Corp., Dkt. 5685, 51 F.T.C. 260 (1954), motion to
reopen denied, 51 F.T.C. 466 (1954); Beltone Hearing Aid Co., Dkt. 5825, 52 F.T.C. 830
(1956); Outboard, Marine & Mfg. Co., Dkt. 5882, 52 F.T.C. 1553 (1956). But in Federal
Trade Commission v. Motion Picture Advertising Service Co., 344 U.S. 392 (1953), a case
arising under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, the Commission limited
its cease and desist order to exclusive dealing agreements having a duration longer than
one year.
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at least where the respondent has simultaneously maintained or increased
its market position. 13 Conversely, if competitors have actually lost
sales, this is deemed persuasive evidence of a violation. 132 Also deemed
to be insufficient as a defense is the fact that the respondent forged its
distributing organization out of raw recruits, rather than experienced
dealers. 33 Neither the quality of the respondent's product 34 nor the
desire to protect good will'3s is a legal justification. For quality is
merely offered to show that the respondent's success is not attributable
to its policy of exclusive dealing-which is irrelevant if competitors
are kept from choice outlets; and good will can be preserved by requir-
ing that appropriate specifications be maintained. 8  Finally, it makes
no difference that the genesis of the contracts might have been dealer
demand rather than manufacturer insistence, 137 or that dealers are free
to cancel their franchise and take on a competitive line.' 38
Less clear is the significance of the fact that the seller's competitors
likewise adhere to exclusive dealing policies. The cumulative effect of
such adherence has been adverted to by the courts and the Commission
on a number of occasions,139 but it has never been made the basis for
'31 Dictograph Products, Inc., Dkt. 5655, 50 F.T.C. 281 (1953), aff'd, 217 F.2d 821(2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 940 (1955); Outboard, Marine & Mfg. Co., Dkt.
5882, 52 F.T.C. 1553 (1956); Revlon Products Corp. Dkt. 5685, 51 F.T.C. 260 (1954),
motion to reopen denied, 51 F.T.C. 466 (1954). No case has arisen since Standard Stations
in which the respondent's business decreased during the operative period of its exclusive
dealing arrangements. Conceivably, the Commission would deem this a material factor if
the rest of the industry did not suffer a comparable decline.
132 Anchor Serum Co., Dkt. 5965, 50 F.T.C. 681 (1954), aff'd, 217 F.2d 867 (7th Cir.
1954); Dictograph Products, Inc., Dkt. 5655, 50 F.T.C. 281 (1953), aff'd, 217 F.2d 821(2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 940 (1955); Timken Roller Bearing Co., F.T.C. Dkt.
6504, Trade Reg. Rep. ff 27,244 (1958); Outboard, Marine & Mfg. Co., Dkt. 5882, 52 F.T.C.
1553 (1956); Harley-Davidson Motor Co., Dkt. 5698, 50 F.T.C. 1047 (1954).
133 Dictograph Products, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 217 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1954),
cert. denied, 349 U.S. 940 (1955); Outboard, Marine & Mfg. Co., Dkt. 5882, 52 F.T.C.
1553 (1956).
The Commission's approach suggests several questions which remain unanswered. If a
manufacturer, through aggressive merchandising and at substantial cost, succeeds in building
up the best distributor organization in the business must he then make his distributors
available to his competitors on the theory that their outlets are inferior? Does it make
any difference that the nature of the business is such that distributors can be trained in
fairly short order without undue cost?
134 Dictograph Products, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 217 F.2d 821 (2d Cir.
1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 940 (1955); Outboard, Marine & Mfg. Co., Dkt. 5882, 52
F.T.C. 1553 (1956); Beltone Hearing Aid Co., Dkt. 5825, 52 F.T.C. 830 (1956).
135 Harley-Davidson Motor Co., Dkt. 5698, 50 F.T.C. 1047 (1954).
136 Cf. International Business Machines Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936).
137 Anchor Serum Co. v. F.T.C., 217 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1954); Outboard, Marine &
Mfg. Co., Dkt. 5882, 52 F.T.C. 1553 (1956).
'38 Outboard, Marine & Mfg. Co., Dkt. 5882, 52 F.T.C. 1553 (1956); Beltone Hearing
Aid Co., Dkt. 5825, 52 F.T.C. 830 (1956).
139 Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949); Dictograph
Products, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 217 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied,
349 U.S. 940 (1955); United States v. Sun Oil Co., 1959 Trade Cas. f 69,398 (Ef.. Pa.
1959) ; Beltone Hearing Aid Co., Dkt. 5825, 52 F.T.C. 830 (1956); cf. Signode Steel
Strapping Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 132 F.2d 48, 54 (4th Cir. 1942).
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decision. However, in one case Commissioner Mason intimated that
the possibility that competitors might emulate the respondent in the
future was a relevant consideration. 140 This is the same "chain reaction"
theory later articulated by Judge Weinfeld when he enjoined the pro-
posed acquisition of Youngstown by Bethlehem Steel.'41
Under a strict quantitative test, the question of what other competitors
are doing is apt to be academic, since in most cases liability can be
bottomed solely on the relative quantum of commerce affected by the
single seller whose agreements are being questioned. Under Maico, how-
ever, it is more likely that the result will hinge on whether the policy
of competitors is taken into account. For although the respondent alone
may not foreclose the better outlets, market access may nevertheless be
impeded where other leading competitors have similar exclusive arrange-
ments with their dealers.
In summary, thus far the doctrinal cleavage between the Commission
and the judiciary has not brought administrative absolution to any
exclusive dealing agreement which would be prohibited by the courts.
In any event, so long as judges continue to invoke Standard Stations,
most exclusive dealing arrangements will be vulnerable. Here, then,
is a technique of orderly marketing which is still fraught with antitrust
danger. The hopes inspired by the Maico rationale and the recom-
mendation of the Attorney General's Committee have not been realized.
It is small wonder that sellers have become chary of imposing this
contractual restriction on their customers.
REFUSALS TO DEAL AS A METHOD OF SECURING ORDERLY MARKETING
It remains to consider whether the objectives of orderly marketing
can be achieved and legal risks minimized through the seller's refusal
to deal with distributors whose policies are not to his liking.
While the Supreme Court has pointed out that the right of customer
selection is "neither absolute nor exempt from regulation," 42 it has,
thus far, imposed only two qualifications: the refusal to deal must be
the product of independent decision by a single trader not acting in
concert with others; and the refusal may not be employed to achieve,
maintain or extend monopoly power. 43 It has often been said, therefore,
140 Revlon Products Corp., Dkt. 5685, 51 F.T.C. 260, 279 (1954), motion to reopen
denied, 51 F.T.C. 466 (1954).
141 United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
142 Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 625 (1953), quoting
Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 155 (1951).
143 See Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951); Eastman Kodak Co.
v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927); Federal Trade Commission v.
Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922).
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that absent conspiracy or monopoly, a seller may decline to deal with
a customer for any reason or no reason.144 Very recently, however, the
Sixth Circuit indicated that an individual refusal to deal violates the
Sherman Act when it is animated by an unlawful antitrust purpose,
even in the absence of a monopolistic scheme embraced by Section 2.141
Thus, in the Englander Motors case, the court stated that "use of a
short term cancellation provision [in a franchise agreement] for the
purpose of violating the law is itself a violation of the antitrust law."'14
But this minority position cannot be squared with the wording of Sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act, which encompasses contracts, combinations
and conspiracies, and not individual action.
The prevailing attitude of the courts is that, barring an attempt to
monopolize, a manufacturer may drop a dealer who handles a competing
line without subjecting himself to antitrust liability at the suit of the
disfranchised dealer. 1" The reasoning of these cases runs as follows:
even if the manufacturer entered into unlawful exclusive dealing ar-
rangements with others, the plaintiff was not injured as a proximate
result of those agreements, but rather because of a refusal to deal; and
the refusal to deal is lawful irrespective of its purpose. 48
144 E.g., McElhenney Co. v. Western Auto Supply Co., 1959 Trade Cas. ff 69,416,
p. 75,609 (4th Cir. 1959); Naifeh v. Ronson Art Metal Works, Inc., 218 F.2d 202, 206
(10th Cir. 1954); Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911, 915 (5th Cir.
1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953); Green v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 24 F.2d 378,
382 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 278 U.S. 602 (1928).
145 Englander Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 267 F.2d 11 (6th Cir. 1959).
146 Id. at 15.
147 Allied Equipment Co. v. Weber Engineered Products, Inc., 237 F.2d 879, 883 (4th
Cir. 1956); Leo J. Meyberg Co. v. Eureka Williams Corp., 215 F.2d 100 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 875 (1954); Hudson Sales Corp. v. Waldrip, 211 F.2d 268 (Sth Cir.),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 821 (1954); Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d
911, 915 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953). See also McElhenney Co. v.
Western Auto Supply Co., 1959 Trade Cas. ff 69,416 (4th Cir. 1959); Osborn v. Sinclair
Refining Co., 171 F. Supp. 37, 44 (D. Md. 1959).
Automobile manufacturers no longer have this untrammeled right of customer selection.
The Automobile Dealer Franchise Act, 70 Stat. 1125 (1956), 15 U.S.C. § 1221 (1958),
permits a dealer to recover damages from a manufacturer who has cancelled or failed to
renew his franchise unless the manufacturer has acted in "good faith." According to the
statute, "good faith" means
the duty of each party to any franchise, and all officers, employees, or agents thereof
to act in a fair and equitable manner toward each other so as to guarantee the one
party freedom from coercion, intimidation, or threats of coercion or intimidation from
the other party: Provided, That recommendation, endorsement, exposition, persuasion,
urging or argument shall not be deemed to constitute a lack of good faith.
See Staten Island Motors, Inc. v. American Motors Sales Corp., 169 F. Supp. 378 (D.NJ.
1959).
148 However, a competing seller, as distinguished from a disfranchised dealer, might bring
a treble damage action predicating his claim of injury squarely on an alleged exclusive
dealing agreement between the manufacturer and compliant dealers, wholly apart from
the refusal to sell to dealers who handled competitive wares. Moreover, as is indicated by
McElhenney Co. v. Western Auto Supply Co., 1959 Trade Cas. ff 69,416 (4th Cir. 1959),
the disfranchised dealer himself may claim damages resulting from coercive practices during
the period prior to his severance.
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Is this, then, a way of circumventing Standard Stations?49 Certainly
it is not a safe way. Where Section 3 is sought to be vindicated by the
Attorney General or the Commission, rather than by a private party,
there is no need to show injury to business or property resulting from
a violation of the antitrust laws. It suffices to show the violation, and
refusals to deal, though lawful in themselves, are frequently deemed
probative of illegality. If the seller makes known his preference for
exclusive representation, and if those dealers who insist on handling
competing lines are cut off, the courts and the Commission may infer
that the seller and his existing dealers are parties to exclusive dealing
arrangements. 150 Needless to say, the single trader doctrine provides
small comfort to a businessman bent on achieving exclusive represen-
tation if it merely absolves him of treble damage liability but does not
insulate against suit by the government.
Although it has repeatedly been said that the privilege of customer
selection does not depend on the motive or purpose underlying its exer-
cise, the question of intent looms large in importance in a Section 3
proceeding when the government endeavors to prove an agreement by
evidence of cancellation or threats to cancel dealer franchises. It is one
thing if the government can show that franchises were terminated only
because the dealer refused to handle the defendant's line on an exclusive
basis. It is quite another if the defendant can establish that termination
was due to the "non-progressiveness of the dealer rather than . . .the
furtherance of any policy of competitive restraint." '151 In practice, this
may often be a shadowy distinction, since failure to do an effective
149 The gravamen of a Section 3 violation is the forbidden condition, agreement or
understanding of exclusivity .... It makes no difference whether this is voluntary or
is imposed by coercion, but without such agreement, condition or understanding,
there can be no statutory infraction. It is only in the presence of this essential element
that consideration must be given as to whether competition may be substantially
lessened or whether there is any tendency toward monopoly.
McElhenney Co. v. Western Auto Supply Co., 1959 Trade Cas. if 69,416, pp. 75,610-11
(4th Cir. 1959).
150 The finding in United States v. Sun Oil Company, 1959 Trade Cas. if 69,398,
p. 75,521 (E.D. Pa. 1959), is typical:
In those cases where the dealers proved unyielding or remained undecided, Sun sent
them written notice of cancellation or termination. These notices brought some of
them around to Sun's point of view, while the others ceased to do business with Sun
rather than comply with its demands. This conduct of eliminating 'unfavorable'
dealers was far removed from 'selection of customers' by Sun.
Accord, Carter Carburetor Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission, 112 F.2d 722, 732 (8th
Cir. 1940); Outboard, Marine & Mfg. Co., Dkt. 5882, 52 F.T.C. 1553 (1956); General
Motors Corp., Dkt. 5620, 50 F.T.C. 54, 69 (1953); Champion Spark Plug Co., Dkt. 3977,
50 F.T.C. 30, 48 (1953) ; see also McElhenney Co. v. Western Auto Supply Co., 1959 Trade
Cas. if 69,416, p. 75,610 (4th Cir. 1959). In United States v. J. I. Case Co., 101 F. Supp.
856, 864 (D. Minn. 1951), no sinister inference was drawn from the defendant's refusal
to renew certain dealerships since such conduct was attributed in large part to the "non-
progressiveness of the dealer" and instances of coercion and pressure on dealers were
deemed to be sporadic and de minimis.
151 Ibid.
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merchandising job may be caused, in large part, by the fact that the
multiple-line dealer has too many irons in the fire. Nevertheless, in the
absence of an express covenant, the manufacturer is free to argue that
his refusals to deal were actuated by considerations other than non-
compliance with a requirement of exclusive dealing.152 Since the exist-
ence of an implied agreement is an issue of fact and not an automatic
inference from refusals to deal, 153 the manufacturer may very well carry
the day.5 4
When it comes to prescribing the territories within which distributors
may operate, and the classes of customers to whom they may resell,
the Clayton Act is no longer an obstacle and there is less need for avoid-
ing a contractual commitment. However, since the legality of these
restrictions under the Sherman Act is disputed in government circles,
sellers may want to proceed cautiously. Does the refusal to deal present
an attractive alternative under these circumstances?
Since the government does not object to the assignment of primary
areas of responsibility to dealers, and the termination of dealerships
for failure to provide proper representation, the manufacturer may be
able to control the disposition of his goods by acting within this frame-
work. The leeway authorized in the consent decrees, however, does
not furnish the same degree of protection as a vertical agreement con-
taining territorial or customer restrictions. A dealer who periodically
invades the bailiwick of another may nevertheless competently exploit
his own area. In that event, a refusal to deal might be difficult to explain
on any score other than the dealer's peregrinations. But why, it may
be asked, should the manufacturer stop supplying a roving dealer whose
sales are up to expectations in his home market? What difference does
it make to the supplier if one dealer picks up business at the expense
of another, provided their sales do not decline in the aggregate?
Putting to one side such complications as customer service and fulfill-
ment of warranties, the second dealer may counterattack, and before
long the manufacturer's whole marketing structure may crumble. To
obviate this possibility he may feel impelled to cut off dealers who sell
outside their assigned territories even though his sales are not immedi-
ately affected. If he does act in these circumstances, once again he will
have two strings to his bow. A fact finder might or might not infer a
152 See Osborn v. Sinclair Refining Co., 171 F. Supp. 37 (D. Md. 1959); United States
v. J. I. Case Co., 101 F. Supp. 856 (D. Minn. 1951).
'53 Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954).
154 E.g., Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 346 U.S. 537
(1954); Osborn v. Sinclair Refining Co., 171 F. Supp. 37 (D. Md. 1959); United States
V. J. I. Case Co., 101 F. Supp. 856 (D. Minn. 1951).
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restrictive agreement between the supplier and each of his retained
dealers. And in the event of an adverse determination on this factual
issue, the manufacturer may still prevail on the ultimate question of
the legality of the restriction under the Sherman Act.
Turning to restrictions on the seller, there is little necessity to avoid
an express covenant in most instances since the law gives wide latitude
to exclusive selling arrangements. Furthermore, although a seller can
see to it that his purchaser has an exclusive franchise or full output
contract simply by withholding supplies from everybody else, it is the
buyer who desires protection and he may want a firm commitment. Of
course, if the seller is in a superior bargaining position, he may not be
obliged to restrain himself by contract. But even then, one who loses
his dealership as a result of the grant of an exclusive franchise may
claim, as in Packard, that he was ousted because of an informal under-
standing between the manufacturer and the favored dealer.
In sum, the refusal to deal is a highly useful tool in building a market-
ing organization which will promote the interests of the manufacturer.
While it does not possess all the advantages of a contractual restraint,
it compensates for any shortcomings by increasing the difficulty of
establishing an agreement, a sine qua non of a Section 1 violation. At
the same time, it does not grant legal immunity since the refusal to
deal itself may permit, though not require, an inference of agreement
between the manufacturer and those who retain their franchises. Hence,
a seller who tries to solve his marketing problems in this way should
be alert to the possibility that he may ultimately have to defend his
conduct on the same basis as if he had entered into a binding restriction.
CONCLUSION
While the Department of Justice seems to be championing unfettered
competition in the distribution of goods, the courts have not followed
suit. Except for exclusive dealing arrangements, which were singled
out for special treatment by the Clayton Act, reasonable restrictions
ancillary to a sale of chattels have continued to receive judicial approval
under the Sherman Act. This has been strikingly evident where the
restraint is on the seller. When it is the buyer who is restrained, the
authorities are of less recent vintage and uncertainty has been en-
gendered by dicta which are incompatible with traditional doctrine.
Because of these cross-currents, the refusal to deal has, to a large
extent, replaced contractual restrictions as an instrumentality of orderly
marketing. But since customer selection and rejection may itself be
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probative of a tacit agreement, the courts in time will probably have to
grapple anew with these restrictions. When they do, it is to be hoped
that they will not resort to a slide-rule guide and shrink from analyzing
the true impact of the arrangements on competition.155
155 The appropriate methodology is indicated by Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v.
United States, 345 U.S. 594, 615 (1953): ". . [Our inquiry to determine reasonableness
under § 1 must focus on 'the percentage of business controlled, the strength of the remain-
ing competition [and] whether the action springs from business requirements or purpose
to monopolize.'"
